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Rationality, Accident, and Priority
Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code
David Gray Carlson*
A common project of law professors is to look at a body of
law and to deduce the one normative or descriptive principle
that "explains" it.1 Such explanations imply some sort of im-
manent rationality behind a vast quantity of historically discon-
nected law.2 I am sure that those who produce these simplistic
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helping to reconstruct the history of Article 9 priorities. A special debt is
owed to Charles J. Ten Brink of the University of Chicago Law Library and
Judith M. Scott of the New York Law Revision Commission for their very
generous help with documentary research.
1. Anthony D'Amato has a theory on why so much revelatory literature
encumbers the law reviews. He notes that "the information value of any given
message increases as the actual message diverges from the predicted message."
D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 19 (1983) (citing, inter alia,
R. Cox, THE ALGEBRA OF PROBABLE INFERENCE 35-40 (1961)). D'Amato
continues:
Many in this group [scholars, law review contributors, and other legal
commentators] perceive that they may advance professionally if their
writings provide a great deal of information value. Other things being
equal, a professor of law will reap greater professional rewards by...
stating a new theory than by merely restating the law. For a new the-
ory has information value; a restatement, by contract and almost by
definition, is not noteworthy.
Id. at 21-22.
2. Roberto Unger argues that most lawyers do assume an immanent ra-
tionality in the law. He writes:
The many conflicts of interest and vision that law-making involves,
fought out by countless minds and wills working at cross-purposes,
would have to be the vehicle of an immanent rationality whose
message could be articulated by a single cohesive theory. This daring
and implausible sanctification of the actual is in fact undertaken by
the dominant legal theories and tacitly presupposed by the iknreflec-
tive common sense of orthodox lawyers.
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movemen4 96 AARV. L. REV. 561, 571 (1983).
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explanations, if pressed, would concede that their single theory
is only one way of personally understanding a law-merely a
"useful" heuristic. Few would claim that their overriding ex-
planatory principle describes the historical intent of all legisla-
tors or represents the product of some evolutionary law of
history. Fewer still have done the sociological research neces-
sary to establish the connection between the purpose and effect
of legislation. The more careful legal scholars will tend to
hedge their deductions by pointing out that their empirical as-
sumptions have not been and could not be demonstrated.
If this hypothetical confessional instinct were translated
into legal scholarship, almost all the theogonies deduced from
contemplating the texts of cases and statutes would disappear,
to be replaced by some exceedingly modest suggestions full of
self-consciousness about the difficulties of cause and effect be-
tween law and society. Although less dazzling, such a literature
would constitute an advance. The assertion that laws are dic-
tated by some overriding normative principle is paralyzing.
The revelation that laws are sometimes the product of numer-
ous conflicting desires, or even historical accident or public apa-
thy, should help lawyers realize the full measure of choice open
to them in dealing with the interpretation of law.3
This Article is a stab at an "informed" explanation of the
rules governing priorities between secured lenders under Arti-
Unger's criticism of the average lawyer seems overstated. Lawyers have their
reflective and unreflective moments. The average lawyer would accept readily
most of Unger's points about legal reasoning if they were carefully explained.
Of course, even the most philosophically trained person occasionally confuses
theory and practice. See, e.g., Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal
Studies Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685, 771 (1985)
(describing alternative responses from the same people to deconstruction of
immanent theory); Yablon, The Indeterminacy of the Law: Critical Legal
Studies and the Problem of Historical Explanation, 6 CARDozo L. REV. 917,
917 (1985) (describing the replication of Critical Legal Studies insights in eve-
ryday instincts of lawyers).
3. I realize that some people will feel the opposite. If those people have
an overriding normative theory that tells them what to do, they feel powerful.
Legal existentialism is paralyzing to them. See, e.g., Diamond, Not-So-Critical
Legal Studies, 6 CARDozo L. REV. 693, 703 (1985) ("One doesn't need to accept
the status quo because it is necessary; one can reject action and change because
of a fear that it is likely to lead to worse."); West, Authority, Autonomy, and
Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz
Kafica and Richard Posner, 99 HARv. L. REV. 384, 424 (1985) ("Obedience to
legal rules to which we would have consented relieves us of the task of evalu-
ating the morality and prudence of our own actions, a task that would be time-
consuming and beyond our powers." (footnote omitted)).
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cle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).4 These rules
are asymmetrical. In most situations, Article 9 requires lenders
to act in good faith. In two circumstances, however, the rules
effectively legalize theft from lenders who have not attempted
to perfect their security interests. Law professors have strug-
gled to account for this asymmetry. Their attempts have been
in the tradition of deducing the one deep structure that ex-
plains it all.5 I want to suggest something comparatively boring
but much more defensible.
Historical evidence suggests that the statutory language of
Article 9 priorities is the product of an unintended drafting er-
ror.6 This error has been widely interpreted to permit profes-
sional lenders ("experts") who know the rules well to take
value from amateur lenders who do not.7 Because the experts
heavily lobbied the drafters and the amateurs did not, provi-
sions that might have protected amateur lenders against
voracious experts were left underdeveloped.8 What emerged
4. Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this Article to articles,
sections, and comments of the Uniform Commercial Code are to the 1977 ver-
sion published as the 1978 Official Text.
5. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer
of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 309 (1984) (efficiency explains Article 9
priority); Phillips, The Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 YALE L.J. 228, 251-54
(1982) (a hierarchy of mental states explains Article 9 priority).
6. By "error" I mean that if the drafters, at the time of drafting, had
fully understood the construction later generations would place on their
words, they would have written the statute differently.
7. The term "experts" in this Article refers to lawyers or commercial
lenders who make repetitive secured loans to the public. Amateurism here de-
notes failing to attempt a filing. Of course, amateurism is not the only reason
secured parties fail to file anything. For instance, experts occasionally may
make a nonfiling error, such as by sending an unreliable messenger to the
clerk's office. I only assert that this latter occurrence happens rarely enough
to justify a strong correlation between amateurism and failure to file.
Another reason that an expert might fail to attempt a filing is genuine de-
ception of third parties. Negation of deceit, however, does not explain a race
priority because, by definition, subsequent parties can take priority even if
they are not deceived. A race priority could be defended as a bounty system to
catch and punish deceitful scoundrels, but I assume fraudulent conveyance
law, notice priorities, and bankruptcy's strong-arm provision are more than ad-
equate to achieve such a policy. A policy of punishing deceit, therefore, cannot
fully explain why race priorities were adopted.
8. Grant Gilmore, a principal draftsman of Article 9, gave this descrip-
tion in his last article. Gilmore viewed the draftsmen as "lost in their nine-
teenth-century dream" and the lending industry lobbyists as concerned
primarily with private advantage. Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and
the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA.
L. REV. 605, 626 (1981); see also Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial
Code as a Problem in Codification, 16 LAW & CoNTEmp. PROBs. 140, 144 (1951)
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was a set of priorities that awards a bounty to experts for locat-
ing and punishing amateur lenders. Meanwhile, a much more
altruistic standard applies when expert confronts expert or
when amateur confronts amateur.
In spite of the evidence of drafting error, armies of law
professors undertook to rationalize Article 9 priorities. These
legitimating exercises have been surprisingly effective, given
the controversial content of Article 9. Nevertheless, although
law professors are practically unanimous in believing that Arti-
cle 9 condones a race priority wherein knowledgeable lenders
can defeat prior unknowledgeable lenders, some judges have
not been as placid. These judges have noticed that Article 9's
priority scheme encourages unconscionable behavior. When
such behavior has been challenged, the judges have circum-
vented the priorities to punish the evildoer.
This Article explains Article 9 priorities as the product of
historical mistake and reassures such judges that they have not
violated important principles, such as the need to effectuate the
intent of the legislature. With respect to Article 9, there is no
single legislative intent. There is only accident, with subse-
quent justification by legal scholars based on the false assump-
tion that every law has its rational function.
As a means of assessing the efficiency of Article 9's asym-
metrical priorities, Part I of this Article sets forth an economic
model to demonstrate that recording statutes generally have a
sensible efficiency justification. The model, however, shows
only one thing: that bona fide purchasers 9 for value (BFPs)
should take property transfers free and clear of earlier claims
by transferees out of possession. The efficiency norm does not
support granting priority to other second transferees, particu-
larly those with knowledge of a prior unperfected security
interest.
Part II of the Article introduces the relevant priority rules
(noting that the drafters of the Code had received "copious advice from com-
mercial pressure groups" that, because of these groups' self-interest, was
"likely to do more harm than good").
9. "Purchaser" here is used in a very narrow sense. The word connotes
the voluntary nature of the transferor's conveyance. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(23)
(1982); U.C.C. § 1-201(32). Involuntary transfers, such as the creation of judi-
cial liens, are not purchases. See 4 AMERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.10, at
562-63 (A. Casner ed. 1952); Reed's Appeal, 13 Pa. 475, 478 (1850) ("If anything
is settled by reason and authority, it is that a judgment creditor is not entitled
to the protection of a purchaser of the legal title against an equitable owner or
to any advantage which his debtor had not.").
[Vol. 71:207
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contained in Article 9, highlighting the asymmetry and ambigu-
ity of the statutory language.
Part III explains why Article 9 priorities do not match the
economic model presented in Part I. Part III summarizes the
historical evidence that a drafting accident precipitated Article
9's asymmetrical structure 0 and describes the sociological fac-
tors that have permitted the continued application of priorities
that favor experts at the expense of amateurs. This Part then
compares the proffered description to the competing justifica-
tions advanced by courts and legal scholars. This analysis
reveals ethical implications of Article 9 that many would find
repugnant. Finally, Part III reviews the instances in which
courts have rejected the harsh rules of Article 9 in favor of
standards that force expert lenders to behave altruistically to-
ward positionally weak lenders.
Drawing on explanations set forth in Parts I-III, the Arti-
cle concludes that judges may enforce such altruistic standards
without violating their duty to enforce the will of the
legislature.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF PRIORITY
Philosophers have never succeeded in totally legitimating
the concept of property1 ' and I am certainly not prepared to do
so either. Nevertheless, I hope we can all agree on a few princi-
ples. First and foremost, if transferable property rights prevent
the war of all against all, one may legally transfer only his or
her own property and not that of another. Otherwise, the con-
cept of property fails to mediate between claims to scarce
resources. 12
10. The Appendix to this Article provides a detailed history of the Article
9 priority provisions.
11. For a critique of the utilitarian attempt to legitimate property, see
Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HoFSTRA L.
REV. 711 (1980). These authors' basic critique of utilitarians is that, although
they purport to be neutral scientists, utilitarians in fact accept unspoken polit-
ical assumptions about human morals, such as favoring commercial virtue over
brute strength. Id. at 714. Truly neutral observers would be forced to concede
that the efficiency of property is highly contingent from society to society. Id.
at 719.
Some illuminating commentary on the libertarian position on property
can also be found in Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between
Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IowA L. REv. 769, 787-
90 (1985).
12. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA at 152-53 (1974) (legitimacy
of a property claim depends on receiving a transfer from someone who himself
was entitled to it).
1986]
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The idea that one may only transfer what he has leads to
the priority rule "first in time is first in right." To illustrate,
when a dishonest property owner D first gives property to
transferee A and then tries to convey it a second time to trans-
feree B, the second conveyance is utterly ineffective under the
"first in time" rule.13 When D tries to convey the same prop-
erty a second time, D is impermissibly trying to convey A's
property.14 This he cannot do.
Fortunately for B, American property law rarely follows
the "first in time" rule. Instead, the law frequently endows D
with power to eliminate A's interest and grant good title to
some others.15 Once A performs the often ritualistic act of pub-
licity, however, D's power to cheat is exorcized. Granting D
the power to create good title in another thus encourages A to
publicize her newly acquired interest in the transferred
property.
A. PERFECTION REQUIREMENTS
Roughly speaking, A's obligation to publicize her property
interest, the "perfection requirement," makes sense when A's
cost of perfection is less than the alternative costs deriving
from B's risk that the double-dealing D has no property to con-
vey. Let us call B's apprehensions the "innocent purchaser
risk.' 6 By imposing the loss on the least cost avoider, perfec-
tion rules (or their absence) facilitate the movement of goods
13. Throughout this Article, "D" is used to designate a dishonest property
owner who attempts to transfer overlapping or identical property interests to
two separate parties. "A" refers to the first transferee who, unless otherwise
noted, fails to perfect the interest obtained from D. "B" represents the second
transferee. Whether B has notice of A's interest will be indicated in each
example.
14. Many courts and commentators refer to a race statute (the first party
to perfect wins, regardless of knowledge) as a "first in time" regime. E.g., Na-
tional Bank v. Duggar, 335 So. 2d 859, 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (referring to
§ 312 (5)(b) of Article 9), certdenied, 342 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1976). In this Arti-
cle, however, "first in time" refers to the first party who has a proprietary
claim to a property. The "first to perfect" rule is another system entirely,
wherein the second in time may win.
15. "First in time" is abandoned virtually every time it is possible for A to
obtain a property right in D's property before A takes possession. For in-
stance, the law of sales of personal property is not a "first in time" regime; A
must perfect by taking possession, which could occur after A has property
rights in the item sold. In the United States, real estate transactions are al-
most never subject to the "first in time" rule. Rather, real estate law gener-
ally requires A to record an interest for it to be good against all subsequent Bs.
16. See Weinberg, Sales Law, Economics, and the Negotiability of Goods, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 570 n.7 (1980).
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from a comparatively low valuing user (LVU) to a compara-
tively high valuing user (HVU).
1. Absolute Ownership
Innocent purchaser risk, like other risks associated with
goods, is inversely proportional to demand. As the risk in-
creases, demand falls, creating a deadweight loss to societal
wealth.17
A demonstration of the effect that innocent purchaser risk
has on price serves to illustrate its disutility. Assume that
goods are capable of generating income and that utility is pri-
marily a function of the present value of future earnings. The
maximum price a buyer is willing to bid for an asset, then, is
set by the discounted value of the asset's future income
stream.18 Determining the value of future income involves ad-
ding the products of every possible outcome multiplied by the
probability that each outcome will occur. One risk that affects
the present value of future earnings is innocent purchaser risk.
As the risk increases, the present value of future earnings de-
creases, and the price the buyer is willing to pay decreases. At a
certain point, the disutility of innocent purchaser risk becomes
so large that the seller of risky goods must lower the offering
price to keep the buyer in the market.' 9
It may surprise some to learn that innocent purchaser risk
per se does not prevent markets from maximizing societal
wealth.2 0 As long as goods move to the HVU, efficiency of the
market as an allocation of resources is preserved. If all buyers
of an item have equal innocent purchaser risk (or equal deriva-
tive costs), the impact on their discounted future income calcu-
lations will be equal relative to one another. The item,
therefore, will move to the HVU regardless of the extent of the
shared innocent purchaser risk.2 1
17. The adverse effects of innocent purchaser risk on the value of prop-
erty have been the focus of legal theorists for centuries. See Hamburger, The
Conveyancing Purposes of the Statute of Frauds, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 354,
358 (1983).
18. A buyer always hopes to pay less than this maximum, of course. The
minimum a buyer must pay is set by the amount that the second HVU is will-
ing to pay.
19. For this reason, the price of items that are or appear to be stolen is
lower than the price of pedigreed property.
20. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the
Basis of Contract 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1320-21 (1980) ("[u]ncertainty imposes a
social loss that reduces the value of exchange").
21. It is important to make a very fine distinction about innocent pur-
19861
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In contrast, unevenly distributed innocent purchaser risk
can defeat the movement of goods to the HVU. If one buyer
has obtained perfect knowledge of the state of title, she bears
no innocent purchaser risk and generates a relatively higher
discounted earnings figure. If that person happens to be the
HVU, the efficiency of the market allocation is not affected. Al-
locations to the HVU, however, will be pure coincidence.
LVU's often will have the information advantages. If so, the
goods will not move to the HVU whenever the difference be-
tween (a) the discounted earnings of the HVU with innocent
purchaser risk and (b) the discounted earnings of the LVU with
no such risk exceeds the difference between (c) the discounted
earnings of the HVU with innocent purchaser risk and (d) the
"perfect" hypothetical HVU without innocent purchaser risk.22
If the LVU is able to purchase the goods because of his superior
knowledge, society suffers a loss in cases where no perfect sub-
stitute is available to the HVU.23 Therefore, although innocent
purchaser risk will not always prevent goods from moving to
chaser risk. The risk itself is always a disutility for people who do not like
risk. The risk has no effect on the ability of the market to allocate goods to
the HVU, however, unless there is differential risk. My comments in the text
about the irrelevance of undifferentiated innocent purchaser risk are limited
to whether the market itself works well, not whether risky and unrisky mar-
kets have identical utilitarian consequences.
22. In the following illustration, in which only one item is for sale, goods
will fail to move to the HVU whenever a knowledgeable LVU falls on the de-
mand curve between points A and B. The seller charges a price at X in this
example. The model assumes that no substitute item is available for the HVU
that produces utility greater than X - B. The model further assumes that the
LVU is indifferent between the risky item and some perfect substitute. If
such an assumption were relaxed, the loss illustrated below would have to be
offset by the LVU's gain from buying a more desirable item than otherwise
would have been available to him.
Demand Curve
I <- A = Knowledgeable HVU
Lost
Price Utility x <- X = Knowledgeable LVU
Cost and x <- B = HVU with Innocent
Rents Purchaser Risk
Quantity
If innocent purchaser risk coufd be eliminated, the HVU would pay incre-
mentally more than X and would get the purchase. The eliminated dead-
weight loss would then be preserved as consumer surplus.
23. When the HVU has a perfect substitute, she loses no utility by defect-
[Vol. 71:207
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the HVU, it never furthers efficient allocation and frequently
impedes it.
Investments in investigation and insurance can reduce in-
nocent purchaser risk.24 The more B knows about the state of
title, the less risk there is of a superior A appearing to claim
the goods.25 In addition, B may insure against A's claim. Insur-
ance is rational when an insurer's ability to bear innocent pur-
chaser risk is greater than that of B, either because of a lower
utility for marginal dollars or better investigation capabilities.
2 6
In the end, B will invest in knowledge or insurance or will bear
innocent purchaser risk in proportions that minimize his aggre-
gate costs. Thus, given a set of legal rules that determine title,
there is an optimal expenditure on costs associated with inno-
cent purchaser risk and its avoidance.
Modifying the "first in time" priority rule to impose public-
ity costs on A may lower these aggregate costs. In many cases,
ing from the risky item. The perceived innocent purchaser risk, therefore, im-
poses no social cost.
24. Kronran, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts,
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-4 (1978).
25. It would help to think of innocent purchaser risk as a dead loss. For
instance, assume an HVU would buy an item for $100 if there were no inno-
cent purchaser risk. Before investigating, the HVU perceives there is a 50%
chance the seller has perfect title and a 50% chance the seller has no title. Ac-
cordingly, the HVU values the item at $50. Suppose further that for $10 the
buyer could hire a service that would provide definitive information about the
state of the title. Whether the answer is good title or no title, the HVU should
hire the service. For $10, the HVU can learn enough to justify a bid higher
than $50, or the HVU can avoid a loss of $50. Either piece of information
would be valuable. On the upside, the HVU increases her demand. On the
downside, the HVU avoids wasting $50 on property the seller cannot properly
sell.
If the HVU discovers the seller has no title, the HVU has at least avoided
a loss, justifying the expenditure on information. In addition, the HVU may
still have taken a step toward the purchase. The HVU now knows who does
have title. The HVU can buy good title from the real owner and divest the
seller (or any LVU who buys from the seller) and, at some cost, eventually
end up with the item.
A complicating factor is that once the HVU spends $10 on investigation,
the expense is a sunk cost and has no further influence on the decision to buy.
In the above example, once the $10 is spent, the HVU will still bid up to $100,
unless the loss of $10 so affects her wealth that her matrix of wants and
desires is affected. It would be a mistake to assume that, having spent $10 on
the purchase, the HVU will now bid only $90.
26. See McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAw.
413, 436-39 (1986); Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 881-
82 (1984). These factors explain the title insurance system for real estate. The
insurer also may have some sort of emotional call upon D that would make D
more likely to pay, as when a friend or relative cosigns D's note.
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A's cost of creating a highly public symbol, such as dispossess-
ing the seller or filing a statement in a central location, may be
less than B's aggregate costs of borne risk, investigation, and
insurance premiums. If so, it might be efficient to change from
a "first in time" property regime to a system wherein D, pend-
ing A's perfection, retains the power to create good title in B. A
perfection requirement in such circumstances facilitates the
movement of goods to HVUs27 in two respects. First, requiring
perfection reduces the chances that the LVU will win the auc-
tion because innocent purchaser risk is less of a disutility than
it was before. Second, even if an LVU does win, he is compara-
tively an HVU over what would have been under the "first in
time" regime.
One implication of the above analysis is that recording stat-
utes contain an important normative element. Recording stat-
utes "depersonalize" markets by neutralizing the inside
information that positionally powerful bargainers have.28 Be-
cause they have this effect, recording statutes should be ac-
corded an important place in the history of the ascendency of
market ideology.
2. Security Interests
The "first in time is first in right" principle has different
overtones for liens29 than it has for absolute ownership. If D
conveyed absolute ownership of a thing to A, D's attempt to
sell the same property to B a second time would be completely
ineffective under a "first in time" rule. If D merely conveys a
lien to A, however, D generally retains rights to possess the en-
cumbered thing, pending default, and to receive any cash sur-
plus in the event of foreclosure.3 0 D may honestly convey these
27. Cf. Kronman, supra note 24, at 4-5 (arguing that parties to a contract,
if acting rationally, will assign the risks of occurrence of mistake to the better
information gatherer).
28. See Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 813, 832-40.
29. Liens are a peculiar type of future interest in property. Liens differ
from absolute ownership of a future interest in that the lienor's right to the
property, in recent times, is for the narrow purpose of selling it for cash. The
lienor may retain cash proceeds to the extent of the unpaid debt, with the sur-
plus going to the debtor. See Carlson & Shupack, Judicial Lien Priorities
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part , 5 CARDozo L. REV.
287, 290-99 (1984).
30. Such rights exist even if the secured claim is large and the projected
sale price is small. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198
(1983). In Whiting Pools, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had levied prop-
erty but had not yet sold it. In the interim, the debtor filed for bankruptcy.




Notwithstanding the distinction between conveyances of
absolute ownership and security interests, movement of goods
to the HVU justifies modification of the "first in time" priority
system to protect BFPs of liens. A secured party or mortgagee
acquires rights in collateral solely to reduce the risk of nonpay-
ment of its loan. The reduction of risk, of course, lowers the
price of the loan. Security most effectively reduces the price of
credit when the collateral is most likely to obtain high bids at
the enforcement sale. If the rules protect 3 ' buyers of liens
from all earlier liens, bids at enforcement sales are higher. Se-
cured loans become less risky and hence cheaper. Because se-
cured lenders can reflect lower risk in lower loan prices,
perfection rules almost always protect BFPs of liens on goods
3 2
as well as BFPs of absolute ownership.
B. THE CLASS OF PROTECTED SECOND TRANSFEREES
To facilitate the movement of goods to the HVU, only a
narrow class of second transferees need take free of an earlier
unperfected property interest. Essentially, the perfection rules
only need to protect BFPs. Protecting donees, general credi-
tors, and mala fide purchasers (IFPs) from unperfected inter-
ests does not result in the movement of goods to HVUs. No
justification exists, therefore, for interrupting the conveyance
by D to A on behalf of second transferees that are not BFPs.
1. Donees
The law of gifts apparently troubles law professors who be-
lieve that every law must have its efficiency justification. Per-
fect market allocations depend on buyers signalling their
perceived future utilities in a perfect market. Donees do not
signal their utilities at all. Hence, some say that protection of
the debt was large and the collateral relatively low in value. See United States
v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 674 F.2d 144, 149-50 (2d Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court
ruled that the debtor continued to have rights in the property at least until the
foreclosure sale. 462 U.S. at 211. Thus, the property remained part of the
bankrupt's estate. Id at 209. See Note, The Outer Limits of Section 542 of the
Bankruptcy Code: United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., Revisited, 7 CARDozo
L. REV. 935 (1986).
31. As used here, "protect" means that buyers take free of the earlier lien
regardless of personal knowledge. The buyer relies on the power of the en-
forcing lienor to foreclose all junior liens. See Carlson, Death and Subordina-
tion Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Senior Buyers and
Senior Lien Creditors, 5 CARDozo L. REv. 547, 569-71 (1984).
32. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c) & (d).
19861
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
donees or thieves is harmful to allocative efficiency.33 Under
this view, the failure of recording acts to protect donees is justi-
fied by efficiency.
It is not so clear to me that donee protection would neces-
sarily interfere with the market allocation of goods to HVUs. If
property owner D simply gives an item to C when B is the
HVU, C can sell the item to B as well as D can. The efficiency
case against protecting donees would have to show that the
transaction costs imposed on an HVU in dealing with C are
greater than they would be in dealing with D. Absent data re-
garding relative transaction costs, efficiency is irrelevant to a
determination of whether to protect donees from prior unre-
corded property interests.
Yet perfection regimes almost never protect donees.34 Pre-
sumably, the failure to protect donees serves other norms, such
as a residual libertarian notion that property rights are sacro-
sanct. After all, preferring a donee causes serious injury to the
property rights of A. Although society can make a buck or two
by hurting A when B is a BFP and an HVU, the case for hurt-
ing A to benefit a donee is much less convincing. Thus, the
sanctity of property rights reappears as the dominant norm of
the moment.35
2. General Creditors
Protection of unsecured creditors from unperfected prop-
erty transfers also lacks substantial economic purpose.36 The
33. R. POSNF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 120-22 (2d ed. 1977).
34. Massachusetts's recording act protects "any person" without notice, in-
cluding, presumably, any donee. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 183, § 4 (Law. Co-op.
1977). New York protects good faith donees from the prejudgment attachment
lien until the sheriff levies pursuant to the lien. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 6203
(McKinney 1980). One survey has declared this lien to be "America's weak-
est." Carlson & Shupack, supra note 29, at 297.
35. See Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 885 (discussing the philosophical is-
sues of bona fide purchaser rules and libertarian opposition to them).
36. This is not the same as suggesting that fraudulent conveyance law has
no convincing economic justification, although that may also be true. In-
dependent of Article 9 or real estate recording statutes, fraudulent conveyance
law strikes down secret liens when (a) D intends to defraud, delay, or hinder
general creditors and when (b) A is a mala fide purchaser for value (a co-con-
spirator with D). UNiF. FRAuDuLENT CONVEYANCE AcT, §§ 7, 9 (1918). The
law and economics movement assumes that fraudulent conveyance law is effi-
cient because it represents what debtors and creditors would agree on anyway.
Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38
VAND. L. REV. 829, 835-36 (1985); Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal
Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1249 (1981); see also Rose-Ackerman, Inaliena-
bility and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 CoLTJM. L. REv. 931, 940 (1985)
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traditional argument for protecting unsecured creditors is that
secret liens generally tend to mislead such creditors. Without
protection, it is argued, unsecured creditors would have to
charge more for their loans to compensate for the risk of secret
liens.37 With that protection, the market for general credit is
improved. The justification is analagous to the argument that
protecting BFPs from earlier conveyances renders markets for
property more efficient.
Whereas the argument is persuasive with respect to mar-
kets for ownership of property, it is problematic, or at least
overstated, in markets for general credit. Its weakness is that
unsecured creditors do not necessarily anticipate recoveries as a
result of statutory protection. The existence of such protection
probably would not cause the reduction of prices for unsecured
loans. Furthermore, perfection by A is costly, both in terms of
filing a financing statement and in terms of learning the Article
9 rules. The efficiency case for protecting general creditors
from unperfected liens, thus, depends on comparing the low-
level benefits of the general creditor's future remedy against
any potential A (as the creditor perceives them at the time of
pricing the loan) against the added cost to A of perfecting her
lien.38 Protection of general creditors from A's unperfected in-
(asserting that fraudulent conveyance law is efficient because it eliminates the
externality of debtor opportunism). Each of these views fails to take into ac-
count the utilities of the donor or donee. When donor-donee utility is added
in, no clear efficiency model can be constructed. Unfortunately, the efficiency
of fraudulent conveyance law will have to be reserved for a future paper. See
Carlson, Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law ffwcientZ 8 CARDOZO L. Ray. (1987)
(forthcoming).
37. Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275, 287 (Pa. 1819) (Duncan, J.); Baird
& Jackson, supra note 5, at 302-03 ("Creditors are worried about a debtor's
trying to get credit by passing off things as his that he really does not own.
Since creditors will charge debtors for that risk, a debtor wants a way of assur-
ing such creditors that he in fact has the right to sell or offer as collateral
what he says he does."); Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA
L. REV. 953, 971 (1981) ("Unsecured creditors may be misled by delayed perfec-
tion even in the absence of a bankruptcy proceeding."); Jackson & Schwartz,
Vacuum of Fact or Vacuous Theory: A Reply to Professor Kripke, 133 U. PA.
L. RaV. 987, 997 (1985) ("[A] deal to give a particular creditor priority without
public filing is prohibited because it is disadvantageous to other creditors
...."); Morris, Bankruptcy Law Reform: Preferences, Secret Liens and Float-
ing Liens, 54 MINN. L. REV. 737, 741 (1970) ("A belatedly recorded lien would
surprise those who had extended credit.").
38. I am assuming that, as a result of extending a recording statute from
BFP protection to general creditor protection, A's perfection becomes incre-
mentally more costly. Before the change, A's decision to file was a function of
the chance that a BFP might appear to take good title. Now the class of per-
sons who could defeat title is expanded to include creditors. The increased
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terest is, therefore, not unambiguously efficient.
To demonstrate, consider the cases in which statutes en-
able general creditors to eliminate prior unperfected interests.
For purposes of the ensuing discussion, assume that the double-
dealing owner D in good faith 3 9 conveys a mortgage to A, who
makes an honest perfection mistake. D then borrows from B,
an unsecured lender. Next, A wakes up and perfects the mis-
takenly unperfected security interest. Upon noticing that A has
recorded, B accelerates D's loan and obtains a judgment. As-
sume further that D has no remaining assets, so that B must
levy on property claimed by A to recover anything. Some real
estate recording statutes protect general creditors even though
their judicial liens attach after the recordation of an un-
perfected consensual interest.40 Under such statute, B may sell
the real estate and keep cash proceeds on a senior basis to A.
These statutes probably do not induce unsecured lenders to
lower the price of their loans. Granted, when setting a price,
the unsecured lender B gambles that either D will voluntarily
repay interest and principal when due or D will have assets to
which B can attach a judicial lien. D's present wealth and fu-
ture prospects for income are directly relevant to the likelihood
of both events. Furthermore, the risk that D has conveyed un-
disclosed liens to A relates to D's present wealth and to the
prospect for future income. That is, the existence of secret
liens means that D was more highly leveraged than it appeared
when B advanced the funds. If recording acts rendered secret
liens visible, as powder does to fingerprints, B undoubtedly
would raise the price of the loan upon discovering the secret
lien. In fact, D's failure to disclose the existence of A's lien
might reveal D's hitherto unsuspected untrustworthiness, so
that B might raise the price even more than the increased lev-
erage otherwise would justify.
Recording acts, however, do not render secret liens visible,
nor can they reconstruct events as if the liens never existed.
No damage remedy is available to place B in the position it
thought it occupied at the time of the loan. Rather, B will only
benefit from recording act protection to the extent that, at the
amount of risk to A could make A file in more cases. Admittedly, when filing
is cheap, this cost is extremely trivial.
39. Although many recording acts duplicate fraudulent conveyance law by
protecting creditors, the examples will assume that D's transfers to A were
not fraudulent conveyances.
40. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-7-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (protecting subse-
quent lien creditors and contract creditors).
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time of the judicial lien, the encumbered assets are available to
B and not to other creditors. The advantage depends on three
events beyond B's control. First, D must not have sold the
secretly encumbered item to a BFP. If D sells the asset to a
BFP before B obtains a judicial lien, A's interest disappears but
so does all advantage bestowed on B by the recording acts.41
Second, B's advantage depends on D not paying off A before B
has obtained a judgment. B needs to have A's secret lien in
place to screen off other creditors-those who extended credit
after A's lien was recorded or those who extended credit before
A's lien was created.4 If D has discharged A's lien by the time
B establishes a judicial lien on the collateral, B has no advan-
tage over other creditors. Finally, under existing bankruptcy
doctrine, if D or D's creditors file D into bankruptcy, the bank-
ruptcy trustee expropriates B's avoidance rights on behalf of all
the creditors. 43 B recovers only a pro rata share of the expro-
priation," assuming there is any distribution to general credi-
tors at all.45 Therefore, to gain an advantage from the
recording act, B depends on at least three contingencies beyond
his control. Because of these contingencies, I doubt that record-
ing act protection is an important factor in pricing unsecured
loans.46
41. Hence, for a secret lien on inventory or other "floating" collateral, the
ex ante advantage of avoiding secret liens is low.
42. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-7-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976); Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Wadford, 232 S.C. 476, 480, 102 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1958) (holding
that the South Carolina statute does not protect judicial lien holders where
the obligation on which the lien was based arose prior to the execution of the
unrecorded mortgage).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982) (trustee is subrogated to avoidance rights of
any unsecured creditor).
44. B's pro rata share of the expropriation, however, conceivably could be
relatively high. Suppose B's claim is for $100. A's unrecorded mortgage is for
$100,000 on land worth exactly $100,000. There is enough money in D's estate
to pay all priority claims and no money for the general creditors. Assume also
that there are 100 creditors each claiming $100.
One would expect the trustee to take over B's right to recover the $100,
giving each creditor a distribution of $1. Under the rule of Moore v. Bay, 284
U.S. 4, 5 (1931), however, the trustee may recover the entire $100,000 from A,
leaving A with a general unsecured claim. Because there are now $110,000 of
claims chasing $100,000 in assets, B (along with every other general creditor)
collects almost 91 cents on the dollar.
45. According to the last available data, general creditors receive only 27%
of the dividends in bankruptcies and obtain a return of about five cents on the
dollar. ADMiN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTs, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATIS-
TICS Tables F5, F6 (1977).
46. If protection of the general credit market adequately justified the per-
secution of secret liens, the statute should not protect creditors who extend
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Furthermore, B may be entitled to indirect protection of a
recording act regardless of whether the recording statute pro-
tects general creditors. Suppose, for example, that D defaults
and B obtains a judicial lien on the real estate encumbered by
A's secret lien. B is entitled to no protection under the record-
ing statute because B is not a BFP, and only BFPs are pro-
tected. At an auction to enforce B's lien, a BFP is the high
bidder. The BFP takes free and clear of A's unrecorded inter-
est.47 B's recovery under such circumstances is the same as it
would have been under the recording statutes that protect cred-
itors. This indirect benefit is a further reason why B would not
lower the loan price substantially when general creditor protec-
tion is added to a recording act.48
Finally, the probability that B will obtain an advantage
from recording act protection if D defaults may be positive but
so infinitesimally tiny, in comparison to the other factors in the
loan pricing decision, that real-life creditors may well ignore re-
cording acts altogether. Some economists get so carried away
with the excitement of discovering a market dysfunction that
they attribute to it an importance that the actors in a market
never would. Just because a rational lender in a perfect market
with perfect information would lower the price of a loan when
her chance of recovering principal on default increases, even a
little, does not prove that the lender actually does so in the real
world. If a banker must process numerous loans a day based on
extremely rough information about the borrower, it may be
highly rational for the banker to ignore the 100,000 microscopic
contingencies and focus on the ten factors that will make or
break the loan. The efficiency case for protecting general credi-
tors in recording statutes, therefore, is extremely problematic.
Although bankers will be glad enough to have protection when
default does occur, the possible advantage, viewed from the
credit with knowledge of an unperfected lien. A knowledgeable creditor who
desires protection can price the loan to reflect the true risk. Indeed, some
courts construe statutes to require an investment decision in ignorance of the
secret lien before the secret lien is voidable. E.g., City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. City of Knoxville, 158 Tenn. 143, 147, 11 S.W.2d 853, 853 (1928). Other stat-
utes, however, grant creditors avoidance rights, as long as the advance was
made when the lien was unperfected, even if the creditor had knowledge. 4
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 9, § 17.29, at 611.
47. See Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment of Liens on After-Acquired
Property, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 505, 512-13 & n.38 (1985).
48. That is, if general creditor B already obtains substantial benefit from
recording acts that only protect BFPs, B is unlikely to lower the price of a loan
when recording act protection is extended to protect general creditors.
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time of the loan pricing decision, may be too unimportant to
command attention.49
If A has an unperfected security interest in personal prop-
erty governed by Article 9 of the UCC, B confronts yet another
obstacle to recovery. Article 9 rules would not protect B un-
less B obtains a judicial lien before A perfects.50 B loses the ad-
vantage over other general creditors if A perfects before B
obtains a lien.51 Thus, efficiency of the market for general
credit is even less likely to justify the UCC priority scheme
than is the case with real estate recording acts that protect gen-
eral creditors.
3. Mala Fide Purchasers for Value
Whereas a choice of a recording system protecting BFPs
over a "first in time" priority might be efficient, contingent on
comparative costs and benefits to A and B,52 the efficiency of
race priorities, wherein bad faith Bs are protected, is very dubi-
ous indeed. Race priorities are likely to generate external
costs. That is to say, race priorities are unfair in the view of
some. Efficiency explanations for race priorities in lieu of no-
tice priorities, therefore, depend on weighing the net gains
from the race priority against the external costs the race prior-
ity generates.
If B understands that A claims rights in a thing, B is like
the buyer without innocent purchaser risk. 53 A knowledgeable
B is in a position to obtain good title by paying A instead of the
double-dealing D. Absent some transaction cost in doing so,
there is no economic reason to protect a bad faith B from the
rights of A. An argument in favor of race recording statutes
must make the case that, without MFP protection, HVUs will
abandon the market, imposing a deadweight societal loss.
I can think of two costs generated by refusing to protect
MFPs. First, dealing with two parties is more expensive than
49. Shuchman, Theory and Reality in Bankruptcy: The Spherical
Chicken, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 66, 76-83.
50. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b). The 1962 version protected only lien creditors
without knowledge. The 1972 version is silent on whether knowledge makes a
difference, but the legislative history makes clear that a race priority was in-
tended. One of the reasons the UCC protects only lien creditors was to repeal
the rule of Moore v. Bay, supra note 44. That case applied only to the trustee's
subrogation rights of unsecured creditors.
51. Hogan, Bankrutpcy Reform and Delayed Filing Under the U.C.C, 35
ARK. L. REV. 35, 36-41 (1981).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 16-32.
53. See supra note 16.
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one. If MFPs are protected, B can deal with D only, instead of
D and A together. The second cost is the risk of false accusa-
tions of knowledge that A may make against a good faith B.54
If B, an HVU, perceives a general risk that As exist and may
falsely charge B with knowledge simply because, under a BFP
rule, false charges are easy to make, B's utility for goods de-
clines. B's innocent purchaser risk may allow LVUs who know
that As do not exist to outbid him. The cost generated by such
a risk would be measured by the difference between the utility
of B without innocent purchaser risk and the actual utility of
the LVU.55 The above two costs of a notice priority system
lower demand for goods just as innocent purchaser risk does.56
54. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudications, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1685, 1698-99 (1976); see also United States v. Handy & Harmon,
750 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1984) (requirement of public notice by filing obviates
problem of proof that notice was given and received); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-4, at
1037 (2d ed. 1980) ("Under 9-312(5) no disappointed secured creditor can trump
up facts from which a compassionate court might find knowledge on the part
of the competitor.").
55. The loss would be offset by the LVU's utility gain from buying a more
desirable item than otherwise would have been available. See supra note 23.
Also, I assume no adequate substitutes are available to the HVU. If there are
substitutes, the loss is defined by the utility of the HVU (assuming no innocent
purchaser risk) minus the utility derived from the substituted good.
56. In contrast, Anthony Kronman has argued that efficiency points to-
ward excluding the bad faith purchaser. In discussing the contract rule that
the unilateral mistake-makers bear the loss of their errors, Kronman defends
the protection given to the mistake-maker against a knowledgeable bad faith
purchaser:
One well-established exception protects the unilaterally mistaken
promisor whose error is known or reasonably should be known to the
other party. Relief has long been available in this case despite the
fact that the promisor's mistake is not shared by the other party to
the contract....
A rule of this sort is a sensible one. While it is true that in each
of the cases just described the mistaken party is likely to be the one
best able to prevent the mistake from occurring in the first place....
the other party may be able to rectify the mistake more cheaply in
the interim between its occurrence and the formation of the contract.
At one moment in time the mistaken party is the better mistake-pre-
venter (information-gatherer). At some subsequent moment, how-
ever, the other party may be the better preventer because of his
superior access to relevant information that will disclose the mistake
and thus allow its correction .... Of course, if the mistake is one
which cannot reasonably be known by the non-mistaken party (that
is, if he would have to incur substantial costs in order to discover it),
there is no reason to assume that the non-mistaken party is the better(more efficient) mistake-preventer at the time the contract is exe-
cuted. But if the mistake is actually known or could be discovered at
a very slight cost, the principle of efficiency is best served by a com-
pound liability rule which imposes initial responsibility for the mis-
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Aside from the costs of a notice priority (as compared to a
race priority), a complete efficiency analysis must consider soci-
ety's external preferences57 for rules that visit punishment only
on the guilty. A race statute, of course, may deprive an inno-
take on the mistaken party but shifts liability to the other party if he
has actual knowledge or reason to know of the error. Compound lia-
bility rules of this sort are familiar in other areas of the law: the tort
doctrine of "last clear chance" is one example.
Kronman, supra note 24, at 6-8.
An "inefficient" result implies the generation of unwanted costs, not
merely the imposition of a loss on one party or another. Kronman must show
that the inclusion of MFPs into the class of protected Bs will cause overinvest-
ment in care by A. This overinvestment can occur only if the players can per-
ceive the risks in advance. Overinvestment by A could occur when the market
is full of knowledgeable Bs with expertise. If only BFPs take free of A's
rights, the amateur A need not invest in expertise as much because the
number of potential BFPs would be low. In such a market, an MFP rule
would cause overinvestment in perfection. See also Tullock, Two Kinds of
Legal Ffficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 659, 668 (1980) ("[Tlhe last-clear-chance
doctrine invalidates the basic efficiency argument normally offered for effi-
ciency of the negligence-contributory negligence rule. The resources I would
put into preventing an accident are clearly lessened if I know that my liability
can be eliminated by way of the last-clear-chance rule."). A belief that large
numbers of uninformed Bs exist in the market, however, makes the invest-
ment in expertise essential, no matter what the rule is. This latter hypothe-
sis-A perceives a world full of potential BFPs-is probably more realistic. In
such a market, vulnerability to any sort of subsequent purchaser at all may
well provide the maximum incentive for each side to avoid mistakes. The addi-
tion of knowledge disability (assuming knowledge to be randomly distributed
among Bs) probably neither reduces nor increases the incentive to avoid
mistakes.
57. The term is from R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY 234-38
(1977). Dworkin, however, writes about external preferences for racial preju-
dice and makes unconvincing arguments against ever including them in eco-
nomic analysis. The external preferences referred to here are for fair
dealings, which must be included in a complete utilitarian analysis of whether
to choose rules over standards. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Lia-
bility Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089, 1097-98 (1972) (noting that society's selection of a set of entitlements de-
pends upon external preferences as well as upon considerations of economic
efficiency); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Cri-
tique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 389 (1981) (arguing that a cost-benefit analysis of
entitlements must recognize the significance of the value judgments involved
in policy determinations); Markovits, The Distributive Impac4 Allocative EZff-
ciency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical
Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1833 (1976) ("[T]o the extent that those
members of society who approve of the distributive impact of housing code en-
forcement value this impact more than its opponents disvalue it, its allocative
efficiency will be increased by the net equivalent dollar gains it generates for
such 'non-involved' parties."); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1165, 1214-15 (1967) (including societal demoralization cost in effi-
ciency analysis of a compensation rule).
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cent but unperfected A of his security interest by extending
protection to a bad faith B who would not have been protected
under a notice statute. In controversial cases, if the public is
discomforted or demoralized by the spectacle of a "wrongdoing"
B deliberately visiting harm on an innocent A, the public suf-
fers "cost." The structure of the public's external preferences
system will almost always determine whether a change in the
law is efficient or inefficient.
In considering the influence of external preferences on the
efficiency case for race priorities, it is helpful to consider the
comparison between a knowledge-immune race system and a
notice system on the basis of Duncan Kennedy's distinction be-
tween rules and standards. In his evocative article, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, Kennedy associates
hard rules with an individualist view of society, while standards
are associated with altruism.58 Individualism means the right
to be selfish, so long as the liberty of others is not infringed.59
Altruism is the view that the strong should help the weak.60
Kennedy does not rigorously define what he means by a stan-
dard. He seems to mean that the more limited the judge's fact-
finding, the more a law is rule-like and individualist in charac-
ter.6 ' The invitation to find more facts-especially subjective
facts-makes the law more of a standard. The standard gives a
judge more leeway to impose an altruistic result on the
parties.62
Little has been written in response to Kennedy about the
circumstances in which legislators choose between rules or
standards. At least theoretically, external preferences should
help us assess whether the choice between rules or standards is
efficient.63 If an indifference curve between the desire for
58. Kennedy, supra note 54, at 1685.
59. Id. at 1713-16.
60. Id. at 1717-18.
61. Id. at 1770-71.
62. I at 1752, 1772-74. See also Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258 (1974) (asserting that a stan-
dard denotes a general criterion of social choice while a rule is more precise
and more restrictive); Nonet, The Legitimation of Purposive Decisions, 68 CA-
usF. L. REV. 263, 283-84 (1980) ("If anything, [factual] thoroughness must en-
large discretion since it ordinarily widens the range of options, costs, and
benefits that must be considered."); Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class
in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1201-04 (1983) (discussing the differ-
ence between rules and standards in the context of welfare reform).
63. Although scant commentary analyzing the choice between rules and
standards exists, special mention should be made of the Ehrlich-Posner model,
supra note 62, written before the Kennedy article. They create an equilibrium
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high-quality justice and hard cash could be drawn,64 the follow-
ing model might shed some light on the efficient choice be-
tween rules and standards. The vertical axis in the diagram
below represents the costs of litigation. Litigation costs are
high when a standard is chosen and low when a rule is chosen.
The horizontal axis represents the external preferences for
rules that are neither under-inclusive nor over-inclusive. La-
belled "fairness feelings," the preferences derive from the be-
lief that the innocent (guilty) are not accidentally swept in with
the guilty (innocent) in the course of administering justice.
When a rule is chosen, fairness feelings are low; when a stan-
dard is chosen, fairness feelings are high. Rules and standards
are conceived of here as extremes on a continuum.65
Fairness feelings are directly proportional to the costs of
litigation,66 as represented by the justice supply curve. For any
I
model, but do not make explicit the role of external preferences of the public,
although perhaps it is implicit deep within their model. See infra note 67.
Other more casual descriptions of the decision process do not add litiga-
tion costs or external preferences into an equilibrium model. William Simon
states that the efficiency of rules should only be judged on the extent to which
they achieve the desired results. Simon, supra note 62, at 1201-04. My views
will differ. It is inevitable at some level to take litigation costs into account.
Eventually, the substitution of over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness for
litigation expense must occur. Thomas Jackson, on the other hand, seems to
think that the costs of over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness can be found
by examining the wealth effects of the victims or escapees of over-(under-)in-
clusiveness. Jackson does not make clear how we can tell whether these
wealth effects are mere redistributions or genuine deadweight losses. Nor
does he consider external preferences. See Jackson, Avoiding Powers in
Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 765 (1984).
Meanwhile, Colin Diver creatively lists various costs of rules versus stan-
dards, but he stops well short of finding any equilibrating factors. See Diver,
The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983). He
does recommend that rulemakers perform a balancing test involving the costs
he (selectively) designates and also makes some "second-best" suggestions why
special interest groups succeed in obtaining a type of rule or standard that di-
vagates from the balancing test result. Even assuming rule makers choose to
behave according to Diver's suggestions, however, they can claim to follow
utilitarian principles only if they consider the external preferences of others,
as I suggest in the text.
64. On the treachery of such an enterprise, see Rizzo, The Mirage of EKffi-
ciency, 8 HOFsTRA L. REv. 641, 644-46 (1980).
65. See Shupack, Rules and Standards in Kennedy's Form and Substance,
6 CARDOzO L. REv. 947, 951-54 (1985).
66. That is, to maximize empathetic impulses or, perhaps, personal reas-
surance against arbitrary legal intrusions, society adopts standards instead of
rules, but does so at the expense of higher litigation costs.
The legislature may find its own choice of rule versus standard easily sub-
verted by a judge. If the legislature chooses a general rule to displace a judge's
fact-finding, the judge can easily transfer the fact-finding from the merits to
1986]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW








given rule or standard, a point on the supply curve, there is a
corresponding level of litigation cost and good feelings about
the nature of society.
the jurisdictional boundaries of the rule. In this way, the general rule in ques-
tion becomes a narrow specific rule, leaving new areas in which vaguer judicial
standards can operate. Whittling down general rules into specific rules satis-
fies more fairness feelings, but at a higher process cost. See Shupack, supra
note 65, at 957-58. The implication of this observation is that both the judge
and the legislature have roles in determining the equilibrium point between
rules and standards. Whether the legislature or the judge has a utilitarian ba-
sis or a deontological basis for reshifting the equilibrium point between rules
and standards can only be decided on a case-by-case basis, of course. My model
speaks only to the conditions for an effident equilibrium point.
More problematic for my model is that the legislature can attempt to gen-
erate fairness feelings on its own by writing extremely detailed rules that
eliminate over- or under-inclusiveness. The implication of this second observa-
tion is that the supply curve should probably be a continuum between general
rules, at the one extreme, with standards and large amounts of extremely spe-
cific rules at the other. I have elected to reject this view of the continuum. It
may be true that extensive codification always fails to rein in judicial discre-
tion. See i&. at 958-62. This point is important when the judge and the legisla-
ture do not agree on the purpose of the underlying legislative program. Where
they do agree, specific rules could displace judicial discretion with legislative
discretion, but only at a very high cost and only at the risk of generating
small-scale controversies leading, once again, to fact-finding at the jurisdic-
tional boundaries. Specific rules to raise the quality of justice when judges and
the legislature agree on the underlying social goal seem to be a losing strategy.
In my model, I assume that the court and the legislature agree on the nature
or the ethics of the legislature's purpose. Hence, the continuum is conceived as
a polarity between rules and standards.
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The intersection of the external preference curve, a de-
mand curve which memorializes external preferences for fair-
ness, and the justice supply curve determines the efficient
equilibrium point for rules and standards. Drawing such a de-
mand curve is problematic indeed. I will content myself with
emphasizing one of many factors that determines its shape:
sympathy for the victims of over-inclusive or under-inclusive
rules. Sympathy for the victim could be viewed as intersubjec-
tivity with others or, if they insist, individualists could restate
the sympathetic position as personal feelings of security from
governmental intrusions. If the victims are like "us," it is easy
to imagine that "we" also may be the victims of unjust laws.
Thus, if the voter identifies with the victim, his demand curve
tends to be placed in an outward direction, so that litigation
costs and good feelings are high. On the other hand, when the
victims are unsympathetic, the demand curve moves inward.67
With respect to lien priorities, the race priority is more like
a rule, and the notice priority is more like a standard.68 Each
purports to pursue the common goal of moving goods to the
HVU by limiting innocent purchaser risk. The race priority,
however, pursues the goal at the expense of more innocent vic-
tims, a circumstance that for some reduces the good feelings
from having laws that are neither over-inclusive nor under-in-
clusive. On the other hand, the race priority is less expensive
for the courts to administer and for the parties to litigate.
Meanwhile, a notice priority pursues the efficiency of markets
at the expense of fewer victims and higher process costs. An
external benefit of such a system is the maximization of fair-
ness feelings.
The case for the efficiency of race priorities must show that
the existing structure of external preferences does not permit
67. Cf Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 62, at 271 (a strict criminal liability
for statutory rape rule is efficient when society doesn't care about chilling sex-
ual intercourse with children over 16 years old).
68. Cf. Phillips, supra note 5, at 232-33. Phillips categorizes a BFP rule as
a "rule," not a standard. What Phillips means by this is that, in developing the
perfection concept, legislators have assumed that A is always the cheaper cost
avoider in comparison to the subsequent BFP. If the legislature had been less
sure, it would have permitted the courts to determine which taker was the
cheapest avoider by reference to a "standard." Despite the difference in termi-
nology, we are not necessarily in disagreement. Phillips probably would con-
cede that a BFP standard allows a judge more leeway to produce an altruistic
result on the parties than a rule that protects MFPs. Phillips is undoubtedly
right that the existence of a perfection rule is evidence that the legislature has
classified As and Bs by their ability to avoid the loss.
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the pro-notice priority forces to buy off those favoring a race
statute.69 The existence of a net preference for race rules over
notice standards must be based upon actual empirical research
and may not be deduced from the existence of a race priority
itself. That a race structure exists does not prove that it is the
efficient rule. The existence of a race statute may reflect the
political power of persons in a position to enforce their own
preferences rather than the existence of a public preference for
low process costs and low fairness feelings.
Because it is impossible to determine society's external
preference structure, the case for an efficient race priority can
never be made. The external preferences of each and every cit-
izen in a transaction-cost-free world can never be measured.
Furthermore, the very act of measuring such preferences
changes the preferences themselves. Finally, because any find-
ing would be useful for a limited time only, measurements
would have to be taken frequently to determine the current
equilibrium. In short, the external preference structure is not a
normative value that could assist legislators.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE 9 PRIORITIES
Part I of this Article set forth a relatively complete theory
of the conditions under which recording acts are efficient. The
model suggested that recording acts make sense when the inno-
cent purchaser risk and derivative costs in the second trans-
feree B exceed the cost of perfection by the first transferee A.
Within the category of situations in which recording acts are
appropriate, the model supported the efficiency of rules pro-
tecting subsequent BFPs. Protecting donee Bs is irrelevant.
The efficiency of protecting unsecured lending Bs is problem-
atic, depending on weighing the definitely positive costs on A
against the extremely low benefits to unsecured lending Bs. Fi-
nally, the comparative efficiency of race priorities over notice
priorities depends heavily on whether the public has a sense of
right or wrong about bad faith Bs knowingly stealing from in-
nocent As.
Anyone who has studied commercial law will know that
the above model does not come close to describing the Article 9
priorities. In particular, Article 9 curiously modulates between
69. The model assumes the existence of a race priority. Because this is so,
the exercise measures utility based upon the altruists' offering price and upon
the individualists' asking price. Such an assumption is arbitrary and, of course,
probably outcome determinative. Kennedy, supra note 57, at 415-19.
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a notice system in some circumstances and a race system in
others. To illustrate, assume D is a dishonest owner of personal
property who wishes to hypothecate the property to a secured
lender A. A does not perfect properly according to the rules of
Article 9. The debtor later transfers the collateral a second
time to B. The following diagram of priorities demonstrates the
baroque70 quality of Article 9's structure. The middle column
considers the legal position of a secured party who has at-
tempted to file a financing statement but has made an honest
mistake and filed it in the wrong place. The last column covers
a secured party who did not even attempt to file. The first col-
umn of the diagram depicts the potential Bs, second transfer-
ees, of the encumbered collateral. Each B could potentially
take priority over A, depending on whether B has taken the en-
cumbered property with knowledge of A's rights. The boxes
within the matrix indicate whether B can eliminate A's security
interest without any regard for A's welfare.
Article 9 Priorities
B A A
Knowledgeable Tried to file Did not try
to file
Secured Party Who No Perhaps
Perfects First (9-401(2)) (9-312(5))
Buyer of the No No
Collateral (9-301(1)(c)) (9-301(1)(c)) 7 1
Lien Creditor No No in 1962;
(9-401(2)) Yes in 1972
(9-301(1)(b))
Of the six boxes in the matrix, Article 9, as promulgated in
1962, was an altruistic notice or race-notice statute72 in five cat-
egories and arguably a race priority in one category. Under the
70. "Of, relating to, or having the characteristics of a style of artistic ex-
pression prevalent esp. in the 17th century that is marked generally by extrav-
agant forms and elaborate and sometimes grotesque ornamentation ... "
WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 90 (1979).
71. A minor exception was added in the 1972 amendments. Buyers of real
estate apparently have no bona fide requirements with regard to earlier
unperfected security interests in fixtures. See U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(b); Carlson,
Fixture Priorities, 4 CARDOzO L. REv. 381, 415 (1983).
72. This Article does not consider the choice between a notice and race-
notice statute. A race-notice statute is distinguished by the requirement that
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1972 amendments, Article 9 is a notice or race-notice system in
only four categories and a race priority in two.
Even though professors are practically unanimous in saying
that Article 9 contains race priorities in narrow circum-
stances,73 the statutes themselves, at least as they existed in
1962, are ambiguous.7 4 The argument that the 1962 version of
Article 9 had a race priority depends largely on a comparison
between section 9-312(5), which is silent on the significance of
B's knowledge, and statutes such as section 9-401(2), which ex-
pressly prohibits B from taking priority when B knows A's
claim exists. Section 9-401(2) is a typical altruistic rule, provid-
ing that "[a] filing which is made in good faith in an improper
place . . . is nevertheless effective ... against any person who
has knowledge of the contents of such financing statement."
Section 9-312(5)(a), in contrast, ambiguously states that
"[c]onflicting security interests rank according to priority in
time of filing or perfection." The provision does not expressly
authorize B to eliminate A's interest intentionally.
Legislative silence, however, speaks with a forked tongue.
the subsequent bona fide B must also be the first to file. If A files first, A can
snatch title back from B.
When both A and B must file (as in real estate regimes) race-notice is the
superior choice because it protects bona fide purchasers from A in the after-
market. An example will illustrate. Suppose D double-deals Blackacre first to
A and then to B. A has not filed and B is a BFP who has not filed. Under a
notice priority, B owns Blackacre, even if A is the first to file. When A finally
files and sells to X (a bona fide purchaser), X will wrongly infer from the rec-
ord that A is really the owner. The record will not reflect the existence of B.
In a race-notice priority system, A has superior title if A files before B.
This rule protects all potential Xs from B's unpublicized interest.
Although the content of Article 9 is not certain on this point, Article 9,
when it has a bona fide requirement, is race-notice when both parties have to
file a financing statement. U.C.C. §§ 9-312(5)(a), -401(2). It is a notice statute
when B has no filing requirement to meet. Id. § 9-301(1) (lien creditors and
buyers not required to file).
73. See 9 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9312.15, at 265(1985); B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE T 3.8[1], at 3-43 (1980); R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-1, at 240 (2d ed. 1979); R. HILL-
MAN, J. MCDONNELL & S. NICKLES, COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE f 24.05[1], at 24-69, 24.05[2], at 24-75 (1985); J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 54, § 25-4, at 1037.
74. Of course, modem linguistic philosophers would deny that any statute
ever has a "plain meaning." Under this view, language itself is a series of sym-
bols with meaning supplied by the reader. Whether the meaning supplied by
the reader was in fact shared by the writer is something that can never be
known with certainty. Meanings change over history. See generally Boyle,
supra note 2, at 762.
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Other Article 9 sections expressly authorize B to eliminate A's
interest. For instance, assuming A had perfected a security in-
terest in inventory and B is a buyer in the ordinary course of
A's business, section 9-307(1) explicitly eliminates A's claim
"even though [B] knows of its existence." 75 Compared to such
express invitations, section 9-312(5)(a)'s silence implies a notice
priority7 6 or at least suggests that the matter is ambiguous. The
drafters' "intent" regarding the type of priority structure,
therefore, is an open question.77
HI. EXPLAINING UCC PRIORITIES
The greatest difficulty with the final form of Article 9 is to discover
some plausible explanation for the fact that section 9-301 (as to lien
creditors and transferees) categorically adopts the pre-Code majority
rule as to the effect of knowledge, while section 9-315(5) apparently
75. The race priority in this case is not an invitation to injure A. Rather,
it simply recognizes that A has consented to or at least acquiesced in D's
course of conduct. See Peltier, Buyers of Used Goods and the Problem of Hid-
den Security Interests: A New Proposal to Modify Section 9-307 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 215, 228-29 (1984).
76. Nickles, Rethinking Some Article 9 Problems-Subrogation; Equitable
Liens; Actual Knowledge; Waiver of Security Interests; Secured Party Liabil-
ity for Conversion Under Part 5, 34 ARK. L. REV. 1, 89-90 (1980). In reviewing
the drafting history and statutory scheme of § 9-312(5), Steve Nickles found
the evidence inconclusive as to what the drafters really intended. He also
noted that, in the past, courts have read knowledge impediments into lien pri-
orities rather freely. Id. at 87-94 & n.636. Unfortunately, in his recent treatise,
Nickles withdraws from this view and comments that "It]he almost unanimous
opinion of the courts is that [section 9-312(5)] means exactly what it says and
that priority turns solely on which secured party was the first to perfect its
security interest or file a financing statement covering it." R. HLLMAN, J. MC-
DONNELL & S. NIcKLEs, supra note 73, at 24.05[2], at 24-75. In light of the
linguistic ambiguities described above, it is a little disappointing that Nickles is
now confident as to the meaning of § 9-312(5). Such compromises may be a
necessary cost of having coauthors. See id. 24.05[1], at 24-68 n.321.
77. For some interesting commentary on what judges should do in such
circumstances, see Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of In-
terpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 798-804 (1983).
Tushnet describes a hermeneutic exercise whereby the judge reconstructs an
ahistorical version of a legislature's world view, reapplying the normative prin-
ciples derived therein to the controversy at hand. This technique allows
judges to ignore even express language of legislators when the language con-
flicts with the world view as applied in today's times.
For another excellent essay on reading the UCC, with much the same ef-
fect, see Hillman, Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code: UCC Sec-
tion 1-103 and "Code" Methodology, 18 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REV. 655, 685-86
(1977) (suggesting that a common law rule that is clearly consistent with Code
purposes and policies could be employed where express Code language is
clearly inconsistent with Code purposes and policies).
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rejects it. 7 8
In this Part, I hazard an explanation for the asymmetry in
Article 9 priorities. While explaining law is a common enter-
prise of law review writers, hardly any of them explain what an
explanation is or why the project is important. Let me begin
my own explanation with a short account of what I think I am
doing.
Whether the law comes from statutes or whether it is ab-
stracted from a body of cases, law is a text, produced by history.
Legal explanation, therefore, could be viewed as a subset of his-
torical or literary explanation. For any given text, as for any
given event in history, there is no single correct explanation.
There are infinite correct explanations, each co-existing with
the other at different levels of generality. The choice of one
explanation over the others as the "best" explanation is really
up to the questioner. That is, the quality of the explanation
really depends on what the questioner wants to know.7 9
Lawyers and judges tend to ask several different questions,
and whether the explanation given is adequate depends en-
tirely on whether it answers the question and otherwise corre-
sponds with what the questioner knows about the universe.
Among the questions members of the legal community are
most likely to ask are:
1) Why was the law invented? (A historical question.)
2) Why has the law lasted all these years? (A sociological
question.)
3) Is the law consistent with any of the traditional ethical
norms? (An ethical question.)
4) Given my view of the world, should I support this law?
(A personal question of judgment.)
Assuming these questions are those a reader of this Article
would ask, the following sections will "explain" Article 9 pri-
orities in a "convincing" way.
78. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 34.2, at
902 (1965).
79. See generally Yablon, supra note 2, at 928 ("One of the features of ex-
planatory statements... is that their adequacy depends, to a condierable ex-




A. ADOPTION AS A HISTORICAL ACCIDENT8 0
The UCC was the great project of the legal realist move-
ment that aimed at taking private law out of the hands of for-
malist-minded common law judges who had no idea or no
interest in the "needs" of the business community. The realist
professors thought they better understood what commercial ac-
tors wanted: a simpler, more uniform law from state to state
and as much certainty as the law could provide.8 ' This desire
for certainty included (simultaneously) protection from secret
liens and easier perfection rules to protect security interests
from subsequent transferees. These two goals are, however, at
least potentially contradictory.
The drafters of Article 9 aimed at telescoping the prolifera-
tion of numerous security devices into one single concept of
"security interest." They also overruled certain old-fashioned
prejudices-hostility toward after-acquired property interests
on inventory and receivables, future advance clauses, and the
like. In more standard cases, the drafters had no great desire to
change priorities between A and the various Bs (subsequent se-
cured parties, buyers and lien creditors).8 2
The race priority itself was probably an accident. Through
1954, the drafts of the UCC had no race priority at all. At that
time, section 9-301 was a complete catalog of all subsequent par-
ties who could defeat A, the unperfected first transferee.8 3 Sec-
80. The details that support the following historical description can be
found in the Appendix following the conclusion of the Article.
81. See Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 78-79 (1984)
(suggesting that lawyers promoted commercial codes on the presumption that
codifications increase certainty and predictability in commercial transactions).
82. A major exception is that the drafters wanted to eliminate general
creditors from the list of Bs who could prevail over unperfected As. The rea-
son for this change relates to federal bankruptcy law, which allows the trustee
to subrogate herself to any rights of unsecured creditors to destroy un-
perfected security interests. See supra note 43. By eliminating the rights of
general creditors-and substituting lien creditors-the drafters effectively de-
nied bankruptcy trustees a devastating avoidance power.
83. Section 9-301(1) read in relevant part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an un-
perfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of
(a) persons as to whom a perfected security interest is
subordinate (subsection (2) of Section 9-303);
(b) a subsequent secured party who becomes such without
knowledge of the earlier security interest and perfects his inter-
est before the earlier security interest is perfected;
(c) a lien creditor who becomes such without knowledge of
the security interest and before it is perfected;
(d) a transferee in bulk or other buyer not in ordinary
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tion 9-301 provided that if subsequent secured party B had
knowledge of A, B could not be senior. Meanwhile, section 9-
401(2) replicated B's good faith duties, stipulating that if A tried
to file, the financing statement was effective against any B with
knowledge of its contents.8 4
Because the priorities between secured party A and se-
cured party B were too complex to handle in a sentence or two,
the 1956 draft replaced B's priority rule in section 9-301(1)(a)
with a curt cross-reference to new section 9-312, which would
govern disputes between secured party A and secured party B.8 5
Section 9-312 was, however, completely silent on B's duty of
good faith.8 6 In moving secured party B out of 9-301 and into 9-
312, B's good faith duties fell through the cracks. The altruistic
section 9-401(2) continued to exist so that when A tried to file,
but did so in the wrong place, B had to behave.8 7 If A did not
try to file, or if the content of the statement was defective, Ar-
ticle 9 was silent on whether or not B had to behave.
Commercial lenders were intently interested in the UCC
drafting process and made many requests for changes, which
the drafters often accommodated. One request lenders appar-
ently did not make was to require an express duty of good faith
of B under all conditions. Commercial lenders probably viewed
themselves as mostly Bs or perhaps As who would know what
to file but not always where to file, given the highly fact-inten-
sive nature of the latter. Correcting the error simply was not
important to them. One way or another, neither they nor any-
course of business to the extent that he receives delivery of the
collateral without knowledge of the security interest and before it
is perfected.
U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (1952).
84. Section 9-401(2) read:
A filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or not
in all of the places required by this section is nevertheless effective
with regard to any collateral as to which the filing was proper and
with regard to all collateral against any person who has knowledge of
the filing of a financing statement which indicates that a security in-
terest in all collateral wherever located was intended.
U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (1952).
85. The 1956 Recommendations deleted both § 9-301(1)(a) and § 9-
301(1)(b) and inserted the cross-reference to section 9-312 so that new section
9-301(1)(a) read: "persons entitled to priority under Section 9-312." ALI &
NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301(1)(a)
(1957) [hereinafter 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS], reprinted in 18 UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE DRAFTs 297 (E. Kelly ed. 1984).
86. See 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS § 9-312.
87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 71:207
ARTICLE 9 PRIORITIES
one else lobbied for a return to a complete good faith duty on
all Bs.8 8 By the 1960s, therefore, the UCC emerged with an ex-
press altruistic notice system in all cases except, arguably, that
in which A did not try to file.
By the middle 1960s, enough criticisms and nonuniform
amendments of Article 9 had occurred to justify extensive
amendment. By then almost nobody questioned the correctness
of a race statute. Some urged, in the name of consistency, that
all priorities between A and B be made subject to a race prior-
ity. 9 Judicial lien priorities were changed because California
had passed a nonuniform amendment on the subject.9 0 Other
priorities were not changed for the avowed reason that no one
had agitated for it. 91
The introduction of a new race priority constituted a meto-
nymic error.92 The Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC de-
termined that the "spirit" of Article 9 was the race priority,
when in fact the notice priority prevailed in five of six catego-
ries and when the race priority itself was the product of mis-
take. Hence, after 1972, the UCC provided for four notice
88. Cf Gilmore, supra note 8, at 626. Gilmore described the professional
lenders as mostly interested in private advantage and little concerned with
structural or theoretical purity.
89. Carl Felsenfeld is a chief proponent of this view. See Felsenfeld,
Knowledge as a Factor in Determining Priorities Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 246, 255-58 (1967). His rationalization is that
punishing bad faith Bs made sense only if they could have protected them-
selves at the time they gave value to D. For example, a bad faith buyer B
should not be protected because B can protect himself from A by reducing the
price paid to D. A lien creditor B, however, was not necessarily in a position to
do that. His knowledge was tested when he received his lien in the collection
process, not when B advanced value to the debtor. Ergo, the knowledge re-
quirement for lien creditors made no sense.
The trouble with Felsenfeld's argument is that it applies equally well to
secured party Bs who advance new value to D with knowledge that A existed.
To distinguish buyers who must be in good faith from secured parties who may
be in bad faith, Felsenfeld noted that security interests "are primarily a con-
cern of professionals. The change in the common law of knowledge may,
therefore, be justified in some measure by the nature of the people who will
be affected." Id. at 257. It is not terribly clear who Felsenfeld thinks the "peo-
ple affected" are. Presumably, he means that As are all professionals and need
no protection (because they make no mistakes). But this is circular. If priori-
ties were more generous to amateurs, the "people affected" would need protec-
tion, thereby justifying priorities that are generous to amateurs.
90. See Appendix at n.58.
91. Id.
92. See generally Harris, Recognizing Legal Tropes: Metonymy as Manip-
ulative Mode, 34 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1215 (1985) (suggesting that in law, catego-
rization through metonymy tends to take on a life of its own).
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priorities, one clearly intended race priority and one arguable93
race priority.
B. PUBLIC APATHY ABOUT AMATEURS
In spite of the accidental origins of the race priority provi-
sions of Article 9, they have endured. I doubt seriously that we
can fairly attribute the law's perseverance to functionalist ratio-
nalizations that satisfied the public as to the justice of Article 9
priorities. Rather, public apathy played the leading role.
Although some law professors think the details of Article 9 are
important, the public surely does not. Few voters are swayed
by the need to make Article 9 fair and internally consistent.
Furthermore, the lobbyists who care about Article 9 probably
do not care about amateur As. Because lobbyists usually are
the source of suggestions for amending Article 9, no suggestion
to improve the lot of amateur As ever surfaces. Meanwhile,
professors who have considerable expertise do not often em-
pathize with amateur As at all. They classify the amateur A as
evil or vaguely undeserving of sympathy.94 Experts have
shown much solidarity in ignoring the plight of As who have
not attempted to file.95
93. "Arguable" in the sense that the race priority was not necessarily the
intent of any drafter when the words were written.
94. See, e.g., R. HENSON, supra note 73, § 7-1, at 240 (acknowledging that
there is generally "no particular reason to benefit a secured party who did not
properly perfect his security interest").
95. An interesting statement of this point of view is by Justice O'Connor,
dissenting in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983). In
Adams, Justice O'Connor defended a rule that the state, as senior tax lienor,
did not have to notify junior lienors that they were about to lose their liens in
a foreclosure sale. The junior lienor in question was the clearly amateurish
Mennonite Board of Missions, which had taken a real estate mortgage on the
debtor's property. Pointing out that 95% of real mortgages are held by ex-
perts, Justice O'Connor saw no reason why the state should do anything to
help the amateur mortgagee. The mortgagee could have monitored the tax
records and thus could have discovered the sale. "When a party is unreasona-
ble in failing to protect its interest despite its ability to do so," she wrote, "due
process does not require that the state save the party from its own lack of
care." I. at 809.
Implicit in such views is the assumption that amateurs have no business
taking real estate mortgages. Although the burden on the state to send letters
to record holders of real estate cannot be very great, see id. at 799-800 (major-
ity opinion), the effort was nevertheless too altruistic and too caring for the
plight of amateurs who have made the serious mistake of playing out of their
league. Justice O'Connor, then, has a paternalist or protectionist plan in mind:
by punishing amateurs, we can teach them their place.
This plan-promotion of self-reliance or perhaps protection of expertise-
was inconsistent with the majority's political program. The majority explicitly
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Furthermore, once in place, the race priority system rein-
forces the apathy people feel about it. To the extent practiced,
the race priority teaches amateur lenders to stay out of the se-
cured financing market.96 If an expert B locates an amateur A,
the UCC race priority encourages the expert B to eliminate A's
interest and split the profit with D. 97 Because of such a system,
it is unlikely that many amateurs extend secured loans.98 The
result is that there are simply not enough amateur As in the
market to agitate for reform.99
rejected the idea that amateurs should receive no notice. Id. at 800 ("Notice by
mail... is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will
adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party, whether unlet-
tered or well versed in commercial practice ... ."). Compare Justice Mar-
shall's refusal to make rules punishing amateurs in secured financings with
Justice Traynor's similar instinct in Handy v. Gordon, 65 Cal. 2d 578, 422 P.2d
329, 55 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1967), discussed infra note 99.
96. See Kennedy, supra note 54, at 1692 ("[W]hatever its purpose, the re-
quirement of a formality imposes some cost on those who must use it, and it is
often unclear whether the lawmaker intended this cost to have a deterrent ef-
fect along with its cautionary and evidentiary functions.").
97. An anonymous author of a student note has made an insidious sugges-
tion for improving the effectiveness of the bounty system. See Note, Knowl-
edge and Priorities Under Article Nine: A Proposed Rule Change in the "Race
of Diligent Creditors," 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 482-86 (1976). The author
notes that courts do not require second secured parties with knowledge to see
the erroneously filed financing statement itself. It is enough if they have
gained "knowledge of the contents" from other types of investigations. E.g.,
American Employers Ins. Co. v. American Sec. Bank, 747 F.2d 1493, 1498-99
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (misfiled financing statement effective against party with ac-
tual knowledge). The author is concerned that § 9-401(2) unduly crowds the
race priority in § 9-312(5). Therefore, the author proposes that § 9-401(2) be
amended so that only those who file in one of the two correct places (in a dual
filing state) be protected from knowledgeable secured parties.
Although the proposal would increase the amount of expertise A must
have to qualify for the law's mercy, it does make the bounty system more effi-
cient. Having discovered the existence of an unperfected security interest, B
can determine the first lender's vulnerability simply by checking the two
proper filing places. Under the current regime, B must check every office in
the state to be sure that A is vulnerable.
98. Census data on the extension of credit secured by real property may
be representative of the professionalization of the secured market generally.
That data shows that institutional lenders hold 95% of all real estate mort-
gages. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1982-83, at 511 (103d ed. 1982).
99. The future advance rules under Article 9, largely added in the 1972
amendments, present parallel barriers to amateurs. The rules govern the ef-
fect of a future advance given by A, the expert who has perfected. If B, the
second transferee, is a buyer or lien creditor, A has a limited duty to restrain
from squeezing out B by giving D future advances. U.C.C. §§ 9-301(4), -307(3).
If B is a competing secured party, however, A is free to give D future advances
at will, U.C.C. § 9-312(7), suggesting a code of conduct under which expert
lenders do not interfere with each others' customers. A B who does interfere
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It would be a mistake to deduce public acceptance of Arti-
cle 9 ethics from the continued existence of the statute itself. 0o
In a utilitarian exercise, each person's desires would count in
choosing a rule or standard. In the real world, however, the
preferences of legislatively inactive and uninfluential persons
are likely to be ignored. If so, the choice actually made by leg-
islators may differ significantly from the utilitarian result. Ar-
guably, the Article 9 priority structure resulted from just such
a phenomenon. Nobody was there during or after completion
of the drafting process to lobby for the point of view that vic-
timizations of amateurs might have a demoralizing effect.
Therefore, the current race priorities in Article 9 are not neces-
sarily in a state of efficient equilibrium.101
C. COMPETING AccoUNTs OF ARTICLE 9 PRIORITIES
The above account of Article 9 priorities seems more con-
is at the mercy of A's future advances. Although the rule no doubt serves to
perpetuate A's power over D, it also penalizes amateur lenders who find them-
selves in a junior position.
Compare the voracity of Article 9 future advance priorities with Justice
Traynor's instinct regarding subordination agreements in real estate financing.
In Handy v. Gordon, 65 Cal. 2d 578, 422 P.2d 329, 55 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1967), an
amateur entered a contract to sell land in exchange for a purchase money
mortgage. The seller also agreed to subordinate the purchase money mortgage
to any future construction mortgage, regardless of amount. When the seller
tried to renege on the contract, the buyer sought specific performance. Justice
Traynor ruled that the contract was unenforceable because the subordination
provision would create an opportunity for a squeeze-out by future advances.
Id at 581-82, 422 P.2d at 331-32, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 771-72. Significantly, the un-
conscionable contract did little more than duplicate the actual future advance
rules of Article 9.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67 for a model in which de-
mand curves for justice differ by the amount of empathy the aggregate of soci-
ety feels for the victims.
101. Some readers may find it inconsistent that the public is apathetic
about rendering Article 9 fair and that the public may not accept the fairness
of Article 9. It is important to distinguish between apathy about and legiti-
macy of a social institution. Suppose the average person, when told about the
ethical consequences of the Article 9 race priority, feels two cents worth of
pain at the thought of some lender knowingly taking advantage of an innocent
A who made no attempt to file. Anyone whose commitment to a social issue is
limited to two cents is surely apathetic. On the other hand, by aggregating the
total pain of the entire world's population, the aggregate external cost of the
race priority could easily overwhelm any gains from the reduced process costs
a race priority may engender. Therefore, it is quite appropriate to conclude
that the public has not been mollified about the fairness of the Article 9 race
priority, while at the same time suggesting that Article 9 ethics is not an issue
that any one person cares a great deal about. In short, the Article 9 race prior-
ity is a minor injustice, but an injustice nevertheless.
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vincing to me than some of the existing justifications. The
most common explanation offered for the race priority is that it
encourages filing, produces certainty, and the like. A recent
and more ambitious argument by Douglas Baird and Thomas
Jackson 0 2 suggests that efficiency is the grand unifying theme
of Article 9 priorities. Meanwhile, David Phillips tries to ex-
plain the regime by reference to a moral culpability scale, sup-
posedly implicit in Article 9.103 I find none of these competing
explanations to be persuasive.
1. Encouragement of Filing and Certainty
There is a group of explanations that is best discussed to-
gether because the explanations suffer from similar virtues and
similar flaws. Their virtue is that they are generally one or two
sentences long. Their vice is that they assert the importance
of values that are not ends but are only means to other ends.
There are four such justifications: that the race priority
(a) increases certainty,10 4 (b) encourages filing,10 5 (c) protects
the integrity of the filing system,10 6 or (d) rewards creditor
diligence.10 7
a. Increasing Certainty
Increasing certainty is a particularly unsatisfactory justifi-
cation for race priorities. It is vital to ask what becomes more
certain. Certainty that Bs can impose intentional harms on As
is a goal that few would acknowledge or defend. At best, the
certainty argument refers to the elimination of the risk that
disappointed As will fabricate accusations that innocent Bs ac-
ted in bad faith.'0 8 If this is what the certainty argument
means, it presents only one side of the efficiency argument.
Costs imposed on A and the public must be considered as
well. 0 9 For the public, certainty is desirable for good faith Bs,
but certainty for bad faith Bs is probably undesirable. The sav-
102. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 307-09.
103. Phillips, supra note 5, at 248-51.
104. See, e.g., Todsen v. Runge, 211 Neb. 226, 236, 318 N.W.2d 88, 93 (1982);
B. CLARK, supra note 73, at 3.8[l], at 3-44.
105. See Shallcross v. Community State Bank & Trust Co., 180 N.J. Super.
273, 281, 434 A.2d 671, 676 (1981); 2 G. Gn.MoRE, supra note 78, § 34.2, at 901-02.
106. See In re Smith, 326 F. Supp. 1311, 1315 (D. Minn. 1971).
107. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 5, example 2.
108. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
109. These costs were not completely ignored by the students of the Cor-
nell Law Review who have assured us that "the predictability that section 9-
312(5)(a) ensures as a pure statute more than offsets the few inequities it pro-
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ings created by certainty always must be netted against the def-
icits created elsewhere. Otherwise, the call for certainty is not
an efficiency argument but is a protectionist argument that is
designed to promote the interests of one group over another.
b. Encouraging Filing
Encouragement of filing likewise is a poor justification for
the race priority because filing is not inherently valuable in any
sense. It is costly and bureaucratic. Those who wish to en-
courage filing must explain what social goals they are really
trying to achieve by filing. One rationale for recording systems
is that they improve the market for goods by lowering the cost
of B's title investigation and thereby reduce B's innocent pur-
chaser risk. 10 Bad faith Bs already know the state of title; for
them, filing is not valuable. No conceivable reason exists to
further encourage As to file beyond that provided by notice
priority.
Additionally, encouragement of filing fails to explain why
Article 9 empowers only bad faith secured parties to harm As.
If the goal is to encourage filing, similar powers in bad faith
buyers or donees would be as useful. Article 9 does not, how-
ever, protect knowledgeable buyers or donees. 11 In fact, if we
want to encourage filing in the abstract, we might as well do
away with the concept of the unperfected security interest and
define perfection as the moment a security interest is created.
c. Integrity of Filing System
Integrity of the filing system, presumably referring to the
maintenance of a system containing a complete record of se-
cured financing, also is not inherently valuable. There is no
reason to have a central index to all security interests in per-
sonal property if bona fide Bs are protected against unfiled se-
curity interests. In fact, it is not even clear that the integrity
argument is different from the encouragement of filing argu-
ment generally. If so, "integrity of the files" also is either an
incomplete efficiency argument or a protectionist argument
favoring those already blessed with expertise." 2
duces." Special Project, The Priority Rules of Article Nine, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 834, 849 (1977).
110. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
112. Furthermore, the existence of § 9-401(2) undermines the argument




Finally, some have asserted that diligent creditors ought to
be rewarded with priority over undiligent creditors. 113 Again,
creditor diligence alone is not inherently important. Although
diligent creditors tend to win race priority disputes, no one has
suggested why they deserve to win because of diligence
alone.11 4 The assertion of diligence as a value is entirely circu-
lar: creditor diligence is valuable because the Article 9 race pri-
ority rewards creditor diligence. In fact, creditor diligence is
merely a response to legal rules that require creditor expertise.
Assertion of creditor diligence seems based on the protectionist
premise implicit in the certainty, encouragement of filing, and
integrity of the filing system arguments.
2. Efficiency
Whereas a decent efficiency argument can be made for re-
cording statutes over nonrecording statutes in certain in-
stances, 115 no such argument can be made for the choice
between race and notice priorities because race priorities re-
ward conduct that many people would find unfair.11 6 Douglas
Baird and Thomas Jackson have argued a contrary position, re-
lying on the elimination of B's transactions costs as the justifi-
cation for Article 9 theodicy.1 17
ity whenever A attempts to file but does so in the wrong place. Such errors
gum up the records with useless filings. Those who seriously believe that in-
tegrity of the records is a significant social objective should favor the repeal of
§ 9-401(2).
113. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 5, example 2.
114. On creditor diligence as a value, see Carlson, Simultaneous Attach-
ment of Liens on After-Acquired Property, 6 CARDozo L. REV. 505, 519-20
(1985).
115. See supra notes 16-32 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
117. Their account of the transaction costs imposed and eliminated by a
race priority is defective in some respects. First, they assume without explana-
tion that, without a race priority, a subsequent purchaser with knowledge of a
security interest would flee the market at the first sight of an earlier security
interest. Defections, however, are not, without more, affronts to efficiency.
Their abbreviation of the economic harm due to buyers fleeing markets
seems to have misled Baird and Jackson into a serious error with regard to
markets in which perfect substitutes are available. They claim that a BFP
rule is the least efficient in a competitive market because buyers will be
quicker to shun risky goods in favor of the non-risky substitutes. Where sub-
stitutes are less satisfactory, they find a BFP rule more acceptable because the
buyer is less likely to flee the market.
Abandonment of a transaction has efficiency consequences only when an
HVU drops the transaction and substitutes an inferior one. If Baird and Jack-
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At best, the Baird-Jackson theory explains only one-sixth
of the 1962 priority structure or one-third of the 1972 structure.
Baird and Jackson do not explain why, in economic terms at
least, knowledge is still a significant disability on B in the other
cases.1 18 Presumably, transaction costs are also present when
the second taker is a buyer or is a secured party where a filing
has been made in the wrong place.
Aside from their failure to develop a coherent relationship
between transactions costs and the structure of Article 9 priori-
son had focused on inferior substitutions--and not the mere fact that the
buyer flees the market--as the principal evil, they would or at least should
have seen that the opposite is true from what they say in their article. If per-
fect substitutes are available, the buyer loses no utility by switching from risky
goods to non-risky goods. Hence, it does not matter if the switch is made.
When no good substitutes are available, abandonment of the auction for a
risky item results in lost utility. Assuming that a BFP rule is inefficient, it
would cause the least harm in competitive markets.
Second, in assessing the costs a race priority causes for secured transac-
tions, Baird and Jackson assume that everyone in the market for such loans
already knows the rule and that all education costs are sunk. Although this is
probably a realistic view of the status quo, they should have made explicit
their normative assumption that the status quo should continue. Once having
done so, it is acceptable to analyze perfection costs at the margin. Expertise
then becomes a significant barrier to entering the market.
Third, Baird and Jackson do not deal with external preferences, see supra
note 57 and accompanying text, although many of their comments indicate
that they think that demands for well-administered justice are low. They do
not explicitly state whether such demands are their own or those of society,
however.
118. The article by Baird and Jackson suffers from some serious internal
contradictions in explaining why knowledge requirements appear where they
do. In accounting for their presence in real estate statutes, the authors
comment:
Neither of these questions [the status of a B with knowledge or a
good faith B who has not actually searched the record] looms large in
litigation surrounding real property, for the most part because the
transactions are sufficiently large and the rituals sufficiently well
known that defective filings are the rare exception rather than the
rule. Defective filings, however, are an everyday affair when at issue
are security interests in personal property, and thus the question is
far from being merely of theoretical interest.
Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 312. See also id. at 314 ("Ferreting out those
who took with knowledge despite a defective filing is not worth the uncer-
tainty and the litigation it generates."). If I may pass over their complete lack
of empirical data to support their assertions about litigation frequency, their
main point is that knowledge disabilities are acceptable for real estate because
everyone knows the rules, and therefore everyone avoids errors. With so few
errors, looking into knowledge is affordable. Not so with Article 9, where de-
fective filings are common. The authors apparently have forgotten that when
there are defective filings, Article 9 supplies a knowledge disability for second
takers of all sorts. See U.C.C. § 9-401(2). Hence, their attempt to explain the
existence of knowledge disabilities is substantially embarrassed.
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ties, Baird and Jackson also fail to measure all transaction
costs. Having noted that it is less costly for B to litigate under a
race priority than a notice priority, they apparently believe that
they have sufficiently "explained" the race priority in Article
9.119 Like the one-sentence explanations from the cases and
treatises, 120 however, their account is incomplete. The under-
and over-inclusiveness of rules produce social costs that must
be netted out against the judicial expense saved by choosing a
race priority rule over a notice priority standard.' 2 '
Baird and Jackson do make three observations which could
be construed as implying that the countervailing social costs are
not high. First, they think that B's knowledge is irrelevant in
B's decision whether to lend or not. Second, they claim that
Article 9 provides Bs with no incentive to disclose their infor-
mation and that this lack of incentive implies that it is all right
for Bs to wipe out As. Third, they worry that a notice priority
serves as a disincentive for Bs to acquire knowledge. They sup-
pose knowledge to be inherently valuable.'2 2 Each of these ar-
guments is either unconvincing or demonstrably wrong.
a. Is Knowledge Irrelevant?
Baird and Jackson claim that B's knowledge that A will be
hurt makes B no more or less likely to undertake the transac-
tion that results in A's loss. A secured loan by a bad faith B is
therefore not like insider trading on the stock market, they say.
An insider profits because he has the knowledge. The inside
knowledge is itself an incentive to enter the market.
This assertion misperceives the source of profit. The
double-dealing D and the conspiring B are in a position to im-
pose a loss on A. D can repledge the collateral a second time
for essentially no cost. Anything D receives from the co-con-
spirator B is a gain. The knowledgeable B can coerce conces-
sions from D by threatening to make the unperfected security
interest public. On this scenario, D and B are analogous to the
thief and the knowing fence who split the wealth transfer that
the thief has won. The only distinction is that the thief may
have incurred some personal risk in creating the theft and,
119. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 314.
120. See supra notes 104-114 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
122. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 314 ("[E]veryone is ultimately
better off with a clear rule than with a legal regime that is somewhat more
finely tuned but much more expensive to operate.").
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therefore, has at least some claim to our admiration. In con-
trast, the double-pledging D may well have incurred no cost in
obtaining the opportunity to impose a loss on A. Furthermore,
the knowing fence is criminally and civilly liable if caught-not
so the bad faith B under the Article 9 race priority. Article 9
practically throws him a testimonial dinner. Thus, it is incor-
rect or at least misleading to state that the knowledge of B cre-
ates no incentive to the second transaction.12 3
b. No Incentive to Disclose
Baird and Jackson also claim that a notice priority imposes
no incentive to disclose the information that a knowledgeable B
has acquired, thereby leaving the marketplace uncorrected. 124
This is flatly incorrect with regard to buyers125 and not com-
pletely correct with regard to subsequent secured parties. 26 In
any case, a lack of incentive to share information, even if it ex-
isted, is a red herring. The ability of bona fide Bs to take free
123. Lord Mansfield understood this point. In Worseley v. De Mattos, 97
Eng. Rep. 407, 411 (1758), he wrote, "A. buys an estate from B. and forgets to
register his purchase deeds: if C. with express or implied notice of this, buys
the estate for a full price, and gets his deeds registered; this is fraudulent, be-
cause he assists B. to injure A."
Professor Jackson seems to have forgotten this point since he participated
in writing Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1169-70 & n.84 (1979) (discussing the incentive of
B and D to take value from a prior A and split it between themselves).
124. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 315-16.
125. A subsequent buyer in a notice regime has the incentive to communi-
cate with A so that he can pay him off and obtain good title. If anything, a
race statute destroys the incentive to communicate.
126. A second security interest is somewhat different from a buyer's abso-
lute possessory interest. A secured party B does not always strive to obtain
good title against A. Instead, if knowledge results in subordination, B might
substitute higher compensation for the increased riskiness of the loan. Never-
theless, a knowledgeable secured party B has a considerable incentive to take
A out by refinancing A's loan. Refinancing assures that B rather than A con-
trols foreclosure proceedings. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERs, supra note 54,
§ 25-4, at 1040 ("We suspect that it is a rare banker who will lend against the
same collateral which secures a prior loan; in our experience the commercial
practice is for the second lender to pay off the first and so take a first priority
as to all of the collateral."). Furthermore, if B elects not to refinance, as a jun-
ior secured party, B must notify senior secured parties that he expects to be
given any cash surplus in case A enforces her security interest. U.C.C. § 9-
504(3) ("notification shall be sent to any other secured party from whom the
secured party has received ... written notice of a claim of an interest in the
collateral"). Although B need not set forth a reminder that A should perfect
against subsequent bona fide purchasers, common courtesy frequently will
produce the reminder. Hence, it is wrong to say that subordination of knowl-
edgeable Bs never leads to the elimination of unperfected liens.
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of earlier unperfected security interests corrects the market re-
gardless of communication. It is not necessary for subsequent
knowledgeable Bs to advertise the existence of still earlier un-
perfected interests. Bona fide Bs are fully protected from ear-
lier unperfected security interests without disclosure.
2 7
c. No Incentive to Gather Information
Finally, Baird and Jackson fear that a race-notice system
creates a disincentive for all creditors to obtain knowledge.
128
Their concern, however, misconceives the purpose of perfection
rules, which is to reduce the amount of knowledge Bs need to
complete honest transactions. 2 9 Knowledge cannot be a good
in and of itself but only has value as a means to some greater
end.
In markets, transactional knowledge is good or bad depend-
ing on whether it helps or hurts the movement of goods to the
HVU.130 Brokers who bring buyers and sellers together, for ex-
ample, are valuable. The price of brokerage is financed from
the difference between the price the seller would have received
from a buyer he located and the higher price presumably of-
fered by a buyer whom the broker locates. Here, knowledge is
all to the good, at least to the extent of the arbitrage. A "social-
ization" of knowledge in this context would serve as a disincen-
tive to its generation in the future.' 31
The incentive to gather knowledge in some contexts, how-
ever, can actually prevent goods from moving to the HVU.
This context is defined by the presence of large innocent pur-
127. In failing to see that their argument is a red herring, Baird and Jack-
son replicate the error of the "integrity of the files" view. The files need not
have any integrity if BFPs are protected from unfiled security interests. See
supra text accompanying note 112.
128. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 315-16.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
130. See Kronxan, supra note 24, at 30.
131. There is another sense in which brokerage could be inefficient. Sup-
pose an entire brokerage system could be replaced by some sort of central ad-
vertising system that was cheaper to administer. A law against such a system
would promote broker interests, but few would maintain that such a prohibi-
tion is efficient. On the other hand, if technology cannot currently replace
brokers, a socialization of broker knowledge would undoubtedly be a bad thing
in a market economy.
Similarly, if knowledge is of a type that is generally the natural by-prod-
uct of some activity that the economic actor would engage in anyway, its so-
cialization will not inhibit its generation. Kronman, Contract Law and
Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 489-91 (1980).
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chaser risk.3 2 Large risk of this sort is an incentive to search.
Perfection requirements-imposing the cost of publicity on A-
lower B's cost of searching and hence the amount of innocent
purchaser risk. If knowledge were always a good thing, the
best incentive to invest in it would be to repeal Article 9. Cre-
ating such incentives, however, would result in fewer purchases
by HVUs.
The attempt by Baird and Jackson to minimize the social
costs of a race priority is a complete flop. They do not rehabili-
tate the knowledgeable B who deliberately imposes a loss on an
innocent A. In addition, they err in supposing that knowledge
is not always valuable. Indeed, some knowledge is harmful
from a societal perspective. The Article 9 race priority encour-
ages certain Bs to steal. By supporting the race priority, Baird
and Jackson wish to protect the knowledge developed by dis-
honest, thieving Bs. Such knowledge hardly seems worth
protecting.133
3. The Commercial Culpability Scale
In the course of a very interesting essay on comparative
culpability in commercial laws, David Phillips also provides an
explanation for Article 9 priorities.134 He asserts that UCC
questions generally can be answered by determining which of
two disputing parties is more despicable according to a scale of
bad behavior. Those who inflict intentional harm are at the
vortex of UCC hell. Those who act with knowledge are in the
second circle. Those who act negligently are in the third. The
most efficient cost avoiders are the virtuous pagans who bear
residual liability when there are no more guilty parties. Where
the litigants stand comparatively on the culpability scale deter-
mines which party bears the loss under the UCC.135
The race aspect of Article 9 priorities is where Phillips's
model is least descriptive. In a great many cases, when A does
132. For a discussion of innocent purchaser risk, its harmful effects, and
means of reducing the risk, see supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
133. Baird and Jackson apparently would agree, at least in principle. They
have stated that "[o]ther things being equal, we want to encourage people to
gather information, while we do not want to encourage people to steal or lie.
Because... having knowledge is generally good, those who want to justify the
common-law rule bear a heavy burden." Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at
315. They fail to see, however, that knowledgeable Bs are thieves and perhaps
passive liars.
134. See Phillips, supra note 5.
135. Id. at 228-29.
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not attempt to make a filing, A is negligent. Either A simply
forgets to file or A has never learned the rules. Meanwhile,
when a secured party B has knowledge of A's negligence, the
comparative culpabilities suggest that A should have priority
over B.
Phillips does not concede that failing to file anything can
ever result from accident or stupidity. If he did, then of course
Article 9 priorities would not fit his model. Instead, Phillips re-
lies on the theory that the drafters viewed non-perfecting As as
guilty of intentional fraud. 3 6 In other words, he simply notes
that the drafters of the UCC have carried forward the tradition
that a hypothecation of goods absent a filing is always treated
as fraudulent, even though A never meant to perpetrate any
harm. 37 The reason drafters did this, Phillips asserts, is that
fraud so often explains A's conduct that courts need not spend
time considering the individual morality of the particular A
before them.138 This use of "constructive" fraud enables Phil-
lips to label A's conduct intentional, rendering A more culpable
than the knowledgeable B.
Explaining the Article 9 race priority on a constructive
fraud theory is inconsistent with other Article 9 provisions. If
A's conduct always constitutes fraud, then A should not get the
benefit of a notice priority when B is a bad faith buyer. 3 9 In
addition, the resort to such a classificatory device violates Phil-
lips's starting premise that it is possible to predict the victor of
a UCC dispute by examining the comparative mental states of
the parties.140 Under a race priority, B is worse than A much of
the time and yet B still wins.
Phillips makes an interesting use of section 9-401(2) in his
model.14 1 Under that provision, knowledge in B does become a
disability when A attempts to file in the right place but does so
in an inefficacious location.' 42 The bungled attempt to file
looks more like negligence and less like intentional misconduct
to Phillips. Although this particular context seems to fit his
136. Id at 248-50.
137. See Sturtevant & Keep v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337, 344 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1812).
138. "When the probability of [intent] is high, the Code, (like other laws)
sometimes draws a per se rule based upon the existence of intention .... even
though the relevant state of mind is not proved in the individual case." Phil-
lips, supra note 5, at 233 n.13 (referring to discussion of Article 9 priorities).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
140. See supra text accompanying note 135.
141. Phillips, supra note 5, at 250-51.
142. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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model better, Phillips still fails to explain why the UCC does
not protect merely negligent As who did not file at all or negli-
gent As who filed without meeting the formal requirements of
section 9-402. Nor does he explain why "intentional" As are
protected against knowledgeable buyers under section 9-301(c)
and (d).
Phillips is over-eager in claiming that his culpability scale
is descriptive. In fact, its normative power is impressive. Rigor-
ous use of the model militates for a notice priority system. As
an explanation for the status quo, however, his suggestion with
respect to Article 9 priorities must be rejected.
D. JUDICIAL SUBVERSION OF ARTICLE 9 PRIORITIES
The final question, "Given my view of the world, should I
support this law?," is a question judges will ask not so much
about the text of Article 9, which lacks content, but about the
construction placed on the text by law professors after the fact.
Many judges are likely to have a formalist definition of jus-
tice. The judge appreciates the division of function between the
legislative and judicial branches of government and, to the ex-
tent possible, believes that a judge's job is to do the will of the
legislature.143 Furthermore, the judge vividly understands that
often statutory words imperfectly convey legislative intent or
that the legislature sometimes has no directly governing intent.
Therefore, in ambiguous cases, the judge should explore the
purpose of legislation and try to reconstruct an answer from
that purpose.'"
Such judges are not bound by the language of Article 9 to
uphold a race priority. Evidence suggests that the drafters had
no clear intent in this regard. 14 5 The state legislatures enacted
Article 9 well after the process of ex post rationalization was
under way, but it is unlikely that legislators specifically consid-
ered the race priority. In addition to the ambiguity of the stat-
ute, there are independent doctrines of good faith that pervade
Article 9.146 A judge could easily conclude that Article 9 does
not create a race priority at all.
143. Of course, not all judges maintain this formalist view and its very
plausibility has been attacked. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 77, at 800-06.
144. E.g., Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) ("The judge should try to think
his way as best he can into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine
how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar.").
145. See supra text accompanying notes 77 & 82-93.
146. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201, 9-206(1), -208(2), -318(2), -401(2), -504(4)(b).
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Accordingly, judges might search for the normative goals
behind Article 9 priorities. One important goal is perfection of
the market mechanism in pursuit of efficiency, but this is not a
goal that is convincingly served by the race priority.147 Existing
external preferences for just and fair commerce make it impos-
sible to tell whether the race priority really increases aggregate
utility.148 Even if it did, protection of bad faith Bs would be an
ad hoc use of the efficiency norm in that a majority of Article 9
categories do not permit the court to apply a race priority.14 9
If a goal or purpose must be deduced for the race aspect of
Article 9 priorities, the protection of expertise seems to be a
unifying idea. Bad faith secured lenders are rewarded for locat-
ing prior secured parties who did not even know enough to at-
tempt a filing. The race priority could be viewed as a bounty
system to drive amateurs from the market. A marketplace free
of amateurish intermeddling may be desirable, and it does ap-
pear that few amateurs compete in the secured financing mar-
ket.15 0 If amateurs knew that judges would protect them from
their mistakes, they might start to enter the market, undercut-
ting the experts and perhaps rendering the market less
efficient.
On the other hand, if the race priority were abandoned by
judges on a case-by-case basis, it does not follow that the struc-
ture of the secured financing market would change. Not every
change in law produces a change in society. Even though pro-
tected by a notice priority, amateurs are not likely to repeat
transactions. Strategic reaction to changes in law by such a
class of persons is improbable. Also, Article 9 contains enough
other technicalities that the race priority is unlikely to be the
crucial factor that encourages amateurs to enter the market.
Thus, a judge need not fear collapse of an efficient market be-
cause a few knowledgeable Bs are denied a race priority.
In the case of Article 9 priorities, the drafters have aided
the cause of altruistic subversion by articulating some concepts
directly contradictory to the race priority. For instance, section
1-203 requires all commercial transactions to be in good faith.
Some courts have determined that a second secured party with
knowledge is in bad faith and hence not entitled to priority.1 51
147. See surpra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
150. See supra note 98.
151. In re Davidoff, 351 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), contains language
broadly stating that knowledge and good faith are incompatible. Attempted
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Other courts have noted that Article 9 does not explicitly re-
peal the equitable lien. Unperfected security interests may be
equitable liens that survive transfer to subsequent purchasers
with knowledge.152 Another possibility, with roots in the Bank-
ruptcy Code, is equitable subordination. A significant number
of Article 9 priority contests will occur in bankruptcy court,
where section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the trans-
fer of the perfected knowledgeable secured party's lien to the
unperfected secured party.1 53 As an inherent power of equity
courts, equitable subordination also could apply outside of
bankruptcy courts. Thus, in appropriate cases, an ample supply
of legal rules exists to defeat the apparent race priorities of Ar-
ticle 9.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate conclusion to be drawn is that the UCC has
two rules-a race priority and a good faith duty on all Bs.
Judges are free to rid themselves of unmeritorious claims by
asserting section 9-312(5)'s failure to provide a good faith duty
on knowledgeable Bs. On the other hand, judges who are of-
fended by B's conduct may justifiably choose to find an equita-
ble lien or an expanded good faith requirement in section 1-203
filing in that case, however, could indicate that it was an explication of § 9-
401(2).
152. See, e.g., General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lowry, 412 F. Supp. 12, 14-15 (S.D.
Ohio 1976) (finding an equitable lien where a security interest in stock was un-
perfected), aff'd, 570 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1978); see also 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.1, at 334-37 (1965) (defending the equi-
table lien under Article 9). The leading pre-Code case relying on equitable
liens to save an amateur secured lender is Porter v. Searle, 228 F.2d 748 (10th
Cir. 1955).
153. See In re Pat Freeman, Inc., 42 Bankr. 224, 229-32 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1984). In this case, the court made some interesting steps toward the proposal
in the text. A had sold trade fixtures to B in exchange for a purchase money
security interest. D guaranteed B's personal obligation to pay. B, however, ne-
glected to execute a security agreement and financing statement as promised.
B then sold his equity in the fixtures to D in exchange for a purchase money
security interest. B perfected his interest.
Applying the straight Article 9 rules, B had a security interest that was
valid in bankruptcy and A had no security interest at all. The court, however,
used section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code to divest B of his lien.
Unfortunately, the court concluded that the benefits of equitable subordi-
nation should go to all the creditors. This solution ignores the fact that only A
was harmed by B's behavior. Section 510(a) authorizes subordination to a sin-
gle wronged creditor. Subordination to less than all the creditors amounts to
an assignment of the junior creditor's claim and the accompanying lien to the
senior creditors. See Carlson, A Theory of Debt and Lien Subordination, 38




The assertion that Article 9 has two rules may lead to a
condition of uncertainty, but so what? There is nothing inap-
propriate about such a condition. Some commentators view it
as the natural and inevitable state of all law. The costs of un-
certainty generated by the availability of doctrinal choice are
not likely to be high. What ought to be controversial is that
ethical principles could or should be sacrificed in the name of
legal predictability. The public interest in preserving the weak
from the wicked is ineluctable. It is as welcome in commercial
law as anywhere else. Nothing except the consensus of legal
scholars stands in the way of judges who wish to do the right
thing in Article 9 priority cases.
154. See generally Kennedy, supra note 54, at 1776 (discussing the use of
good faith standards and rules by altruistic and individualistic judges). Felsen-
feld recognized the duality of Article 9 priorities in writing that "[s]ince the
bankruptcy court is a court of equity, it may well be questioned whether the
rule of section 9-312(5)(a), that the first to attach wins without regard to
knowledge of another's interest, will be respected." Felsenfeld, supra note 89,
at 254. I disagree only in that all courts in this context should feel free to




Historical Evidence on the UCC's Race Priority
1. GENERAL BACKGROUND
The UCC was the joint project of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the Conference) and
the American Law Institute (ALl). The idea of a uniform com-
mercial code was first proposed to the Conference in 1940 by
William A. Schnader, a former Attorney General of Penn-
sylvania.1 The ALI was viewed as an important source of aca-
demic wisdom and cheap labor. By 1944, the Conference and
the ALI had agreed upon a bureaucracy to accomplish the
task.2 There would be an Editorial Board, which would include
a chairman and two representatives each from the Conference
and ALI.3 The Editorial Board would supervise a Chief Re-
porter, Karl Llewellyn, and an Associate Chief Reporter, Soia
Mentschikoff. In addition, there would be a separate reporter
for each Article of the UCC. Each reporter was to submit his
work to a committee of advisors. If the advisors approved, they
would forward the work to the Council of the ALI and to one
of two sections of the Conference for final sanctification before
submission to state legislatures. 4
Up to 1951 or so, the actual drafters of Article 9 seem to
have been Allison Dunham5 and Grant Gilmore.6 Thereafter,
Gilmore seems to have had administrative control over the text
1. Schnader, Address of the President, 1940 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L
CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS AND PROC. OF THE 50TH ANN. CONF.
35, 58 [hereinafter 1940 HANDBOOK]; for additional background, see Schnader,
A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 22 U. MAm L. REV. 1 (1967); Mentschikoff, Reflections of a Drafter,
43 OHIO ST. L.J. 537 (1982).
2. For discussions of the roles of the Conference and the ALI, see 1940
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 116-17; ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, REPORT ON PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2 (January 20, 1953)
[hereinafter CITY BAR REPORT], reprinted in 15 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
DRAFTS 310 (E. Kelly ed. 1984); Mentschikoff, supra note 1, at 541.
3. Mentschikoff, supra note 1, at 541. In 1950, the Editorial Board was
expanded to sixteen members. Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 800 (1958).
4. Schnader, supra note 1, at 4.
5. See Dunham, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 569-70
(1982).




of Article 9.7 It is unclear, however, exactly who was involved
in the events that follow.
2. THE DRAFTING ERROR
The first official draft of the UCC was produced in 1952. In
this draft, secured party A and subsequent secured party B
were governed by a race-notice priority. The structure of the
relevant sections at that time was as follows:
9-301(1) 9-312 9-401(2)
Unperfected A to be Between A and B (a In its present
subordinate to (a) perfected security form-financing
Bs who could beat party), the first to statement in wrong
even perfected As; perfect wins, except place effective
(b) secured party for enumerated against Bs with
Bs "who become circumstances;8 B's knowledge of the




Section 9-401(2) seems redundant in light of section 9-301(1)(b)
(1952). 9 Apparently, the drafters were concerned about "occa-
sional decisions that an improperly filed record is ineffective to
7. See Coogan, In Memoriam, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. i (1982).
8. The enumerated exceptions were as follows: (1) The basic rule was
"first to perfect." Perfection, however, was quite precisely defined to mean
filing plus attachment. Attachment was, in turn, defined to mean (i) a security
agreement, (ii) debtor had rights in the collateral, and (iii) creditor had given
value. Hence, it was possible for A to perfect after he filed. The first
exception therefore made clear that A's priority related back to the time of A's
pre-perfection security interest. (2) A similar rule for A's future advances
gave priority as of the time A filed. (3) A similar rule gave priority to A when
D acquired new property and A had after-acquired property rights thereto.
(4) The purchase money lender was given a superpriority over the after-
acquired property lender. (5) Conflicting purchase money lenders were to
share equally. (6) Short-term crop financers were given a superpriority. (7) A
surety's security interest was subordinated to subsequent lenders who gave
new value.
This last item was highly controversial. Although passed into law by
Pennsylvania, the first state to adopt the UCC, the legislature quickly
eliminated subsection (7) at the suggestion of the insurance industry. See ALI
& NAT'L CONF. OF COMI'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, SUPPLEMENT No. 1 TO THE
1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT OF TEXT AND COMMENTS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE at 111 (1955) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENT No. 1], reprinted in 17 UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 309 (E. Kelly ed. 1984).
9. See 3 STATE OF NEW YORK, LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 63 (1955) ("This subsection is probably intended
to emphasize the rule stated in Section 9-301(1) .... ).
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give notice even to a person who knows of it."10
The 1952 draft was introduced in numerous legislatures.'"
The Pennsylvania legislature unanimously enacted the draft
into law in April 1953.12 In New York, however, some objec-
tions were immediately raised and the legislature asked the
New York Law Revision Commission to study the UCC as a
whole.' 3 Meanwhile, numerous state legislatures decided to
wait for New York's decision. A frequently expressed justifica-
tion was that New York was the country's leading commercial
state and that the UCC should not be considered unless New
York blessed it first.' 4
In response to some of the objections from New York and
elsewhere,' 5 the recently enlarged Permanent Editorial Board
appointed subcommittees to consider changes in the 1952 draft.
The Article 9 subcommittee's first product was Supplement No.
1 to the 1952 Official Draft, published in January 1955.16 In this
draft, section 9-312 was radically rewritten into largely its pres-
ent form. The other sections were unaffected, so that the struc-
ture of the priority between A and B was as follows:
10. U.C.C. § 9-401(2) comment 4 (1952). See also In re Turchin, 260 A.D.
447, 448, 23 N.Y.S.2d 144, 145 (1940) (allowing a judgment creditor to prevail
over an improperly filed mortgage lien).
11. See CITY BAR REPORT, .supra note 2, at 5.
12. Act of April 6, 1953, 1953 Pa. Laws 3 (codified as amended at 13 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101-9507 (Purdon 1984)). See also ScImader, How and
When the Uniform Commercial Code Can Be Enacted, 1953 HANDBOOK OF THE
NAT'L CONF. OF COmm'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS AND PROC. OF THE ANN. CONF.
MEETING IN ITS 62ND YEAR 126, 127 [hereinafter 1953 HANDBOOK] (comment-
ing on passage of the UCC in Pennsylvania).
13. According to Soia Mentschikoff, Governor Thomas E. Dewey was in-
fluenced by Nelson Aldrich, President of Chase Manhattan Bank, to commit
the UCC to the Law Revision Commission study. Mentschikoff, supra note 1,
at 544. Robert Braucher blames Emmett Smith, in-house counsel of Chase
Manhattan Bank, who circulated a memorandum criticizing the drafting of the
UCC. Braucher wrote, "It seems a fair guess that Smith was largely responsi-
ble for the fact that no state except Pennsylvania enacted the Code before
1957." Braucher, supra note 3, at 802.
14. See 1953 HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 130-35; Report of the Legislative
Committee, 1956 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS AND PROC. OF THE ANN. CONF. MEETING IN THE 65TH YEAR 101, 113
[hereinafter 1956 HANDBOOK] (comments by William A. Schnader); Report of
the Executive Committee, 1957 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS AND PROC. OF THE ANN. CONF. MEETING IN THE 66TH YEAR
98, 104 [hereinafter 1957 HANDBOOK].
15. See CITY BAR REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-10.
16. STATE OF NEW YORK, LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNI.




Unperfected A to be Rewritten to In its present
subordinate to (a) approximately its form-financing
Bs who could beat present form; statement in wrong
even perfected As; knowledge not place effective
(b) secured party mentioned except against Bs with
Bs "who becomes that 9-301 expressly knowledge of the




Soon after issuing Supplement No. 1 in 1955, the Article 9
subcommittee made what may have been a drafting error. The
meetings at which the subcommittee made the changes were
held August 12 and 13.17 Eventually, the changes were pub-
lished as part of the suggested 1956 changes, which were repub-
lished as the official 1957 draft.1 8 On August 12 or 13, 1955, the
17. A document prepared by the New York Law Revision Commission
states that the changes occurred in August 1955. See Report of a Meeting of
the Committee on Uniform Commercial Code: Article 9--Secured Transac-
tions, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
42 West 44th Street, New York City, December 1, 1955 at 10:00 a.m., December
2, 1955 at 2:00 p.m., December 8, 1955 at 10:00 am., December 15, 1955 at 10:00
a.m. and December 16, 1955 at 10:00 a.m. at 61 (papers of K. Llewellyn, Univer-
sity of Chicago Law Library, item J.XVII.4.a.) [hereinafter New York Min-
utes].
In these minutes, the New York Committee refers to two papers by Fran-
cis Ireton, a member of the Permanent Editorial Board's Article 9 committee.
One of these papers describes changes made at meetings of July 22-24, 1955.
The other describes changes made at meetings held August 12 and 13.
I have not been able to locate Ireton's paper covering the August meet-
ings, but I do have Ireton's paper covering the July meetings. This document
was located by Judy Scott of the New York Law Revision Commission in the
basement files of the Commission's office in Albany, New York. See J. F.
Ireton, Article 9 Sub-committee-Uniform Commercial Code Interim Sum-
mary of Action Taken at Meeting Held July 22, 23, and 24, 1955. The race pri-
ority is not referred to in Ireton's description of the July meeting. Therefore,
based on the quotations from the New York Minutes, I have concluded that
the race priority was invented either August 12 or 13, 1955.
See also Coogan, Uniform Commercial Code Article 9-Secured Transac-
tions (Oct. 6, 1955) (papers of K. Llewellyn, University of Chicago Law Li-
brary, item J.XVII.4.b.). This document probably was revised by Laura T.
Mulvaney, Assistant to the Director of Research, New York Law Revision
Commission, because her initials are typed into the margins of the document.
The document notes, at 24, that § 9-301 was revised July 22, August 12 and Au-
gust 13, 1955, by the Permanent Editorial Board, and that § 9-312(5) (then
codified as § 9-312(6)) was revised August 12, 1955. Id at 44.
18. These changes are described in 1956 HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 113-




Permanent Editorial Board's Article 9 committee apparently
determined that section 9-312 should be the only provision cov-
ering the contest between A and secured party B.19 Section 9-
301(1) still mentioned secured party Bs.20 The reference to
knowledge, however, was gone. Furthermore, a knowledge ref-
erence never was put into section 9-312, although it remained in
section 9-401(2). As a result, the priority between an un-
perfected A and a secured party B had the following structure:
9-301(1) 9-312 9-401(2)
Unperfected A to be In approximately its In its present
subordinate to present form; form-financing
secured party Bs knowledge not statement in wrong
according to 9-312 mentioned except place effective
that 9-301 expressly against Bs with
preserved knowledge of the
contents
I have found only one document that reflects the intent of
the drafters directly involved in the race priority. Francis
Ireton, chairman of the Permanent Editorial Board's Article 9
committee,2 1 prepared a memorandum describing the meeting.
I have not been able to find this memorandum, but the minutes
of a meeting of the New York Law Revision Commission's advi-
sory committee on the UCC refer specifically to it. The anony-
mous author of these committee minutes comments:
It was observed that [Ireton's] Summary of Action of the Subcommiit-
tee on Article 9 taken at its August, 1955 meeting proposes a revision
of paragraph (b) of subdivision (1) of Section 9-301 to refer merely to
"a secured party entitled to priority under Section 9-312" instead of "a
subsequent secured party who becomes such without knowledge of
the earlier security interest and perfects his interest before the earlier
security interest is perfected."
[T]his proposed revision is explained in [Ireton's paper] as di-
rected to an inconsistency between the existing text and Section 9-
19. See ALI & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAws, 1956 REc-
OMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-301 reason for change ("Subsection (1) has been changed to transfer
all questions of priority to Section 9-312"), reprinted in 18 UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE DRAFTs 298 (E. Kelly ed. 1984).
20. Apparently, this was done to preserve § 9-301 as a complete catalog of
Bs who could possibly beat unperfected As. Even so, it is not a complete list.
For example, § 9-301(1) nowhere states that buyers in the ordinary course of
business take free of unperfected security interests, although there is no ques-
tion that they should.
21. Members of the Article 9 committee at the time included J. Francis
Ireton, Homer L. Kripke, Anthony G. Felix, Jr., Peter F. Coogan, Grant Gil-
more, and Harold F. Birnbaum.
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312(5)(a) or (c), which... state rules of priority among security in-
terests in the same collateral.
It was observed that the language of Section 9-301(2)(b)[ 2 2] is in-
deed inconsistent with Section 9-312(5), in that it refers to a subse-
quent secured party who "becomes such" without knowledge of the
earlier security interest, and perfects his security interest before the
earlier interest is perfected, whereas Section 9-312(5) does not require
that the subsequent secured party be without knowledge of the ear-
lier security interest .... ,,23
In the above passage, the author of the minutes quotes Ireton
as recognizing explicitly that section 9-301(1)(b) was inconsis-
tent with section 9-312(5). I do not believe that this acknowl-
egement of inconsistency proves that the race priority is the
product of deliberate choice. The eventual comments to section
9-312(5) discuss the race priority in the following way:
A and B make non-purchase money advances against the same collat-
eral. The collateral is in the debtor's possession and neither interest
is perfected when the second advance is made. Whichever secured
party first perfects his interest ... takes priority and it makes no dif-
frence whether or not he knows of the other interest at the time he
perfects his own.24
If Ireton's justification for eliminating the knowledge require-
ment in 9-301(1)(b) is related to the above comment on the ef-
fect of B's knowledge, it appears that the Article 9 sub-
committee was concerned about subordinating a BFP B who
was originally unperfected and who had knowledge at the time
of perfection, not at the time B first made the loan. The equi-
ties of the above problem are miles away from the equities of a
bad faith B who has not given an advance and could avoid harm
to A by refraining from the loan. The subsequent remarks
from the comment to section 9-312 bear this out: "This result
may be regarded as an adoption, in this situation, of the idea,
deeply rooted at common law, of a race of diligence among
creditors. '25
Now, race priorities were not deeply rooted (among se-
cured creditors) at common law, but race-notice priorities were.
In a race-notice priority, A and B have not perfected. B is a
BFP. Between A and B, the first to perfect wins, so that A has
the potential to regain priority from a BFP. Thus, A and B are
engaged in a race, but only if B was a BFP at the time B gave
value. This is done to protect the aftermarket. If A is the first
22. This reference is incorrect. It should refer to § 9-301(1)(b).
23. New York Minutes, supra note 17, at 61-62.




to perfect and wants to sell to X, X could never tell from the
record that A was not really the owner or that B (the BFP)
was. Therefore, I believe that the comment to section 9-312 is
interested in establishing a race-notice priority between A and
B, not a pure race in which MFPs could destroy innocent As. 26
At any rate, the first state to adopt the race priority was
Massachusetts.2 7 Although Pennsylvania had enacted the UCC
in 1954, the 1956 amendments were not added until 1959, two
years after their adoption in Massachusetts. 28
3. SUBSEQUENT RATIONALIZATIONS OF THE RACE PRIORITY
The first documented reaction to the introduction of the
race priority in the set of changes following Supplement No. 1
occurred at meetings held by the UCC subcommittee of the
New York Law Revision Commission. These meetings were
held in December 1955.29 I have already quoted from the min-
26. Accord 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
§ 34.2, at 900-01 (1965) (dismissing comment 5 as not necessarily relevant in
proving that a race priority was intended).
Gilmore's role in the drafting is somewhat mysterious. He was a member
of the Permanent Editorial Board's subcommittee, but he denies that he was
involved in the changes reflected in the 1956 Suggested Changes. See 1 G. GIL.
MORE, supra note 6, § 21.6, at 590 n.4. He does, however, acknowledge that he
"was in general responsible for preparing the Article 9 Comments," which
were produced a few years after the changes were made. Id. See Braucher,
Book Review, 33 U. Cm. L. REV. 890, 892 (1966) ("In the drafting of article 9,
Professor Gilmore had much greater control of the process leading up to the
1952 Draft than in the revisions made in 1956 and subsequently.").
I can offer one theory: Gilmore, as a member of Ireton's committee, was
not present at the meeting but did receive Ireton's memorandum justifying the
changes in § 9-301. On the basis of this memorandum, Gilmore wrote the com-
ments quoted in the text of the appendix. Years later, in writing his treatise,
Gilmore could say (authoritatively) that the official comments were not in-
tended to defend a race priority. Meanwhile, Gilmore, on the basis of the
memorandum (or his recollection of it) was free to speculate, as he did, that
the race priority was not intended to be placed in the statutory language. See
infra text accompanying notes 44-46.
It may be noted that the first edition of the Gilmore and Black admiralty
treatise appeared in 1957. Perhaps, in the summer of 1955, Gilmore was so
fully occupied with his admiralty project that he could not focus upon minor
developments in Article 9 draftsmanship.
27. Act approved Sept. 11, 1957, ch. 765, 1957 Mass. Acts 764 (codified as
amended at MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 106 (Law. Co-op. 1984)).
28. Act of Oct. 2, 1959, No. 426, 1959 Pa. Laws 1023 (codified as amended
at 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1984)). See Goodwin, Major Revisions in
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code-Secured Transactions, 31 PA.
B.A.Q. 261, 261 (1960).
29. Members of this subcommittee included John R. Bartels, Millard H.
Ellison, Laura T. Mulvany, John Hanna, and Simon Rosenzweig.
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utes to these meetings.3 0
The New York Minutes recognize that there were some le-
gitimate reasons to take the broad knowledge rule out of sec-
tion 9-301. After the above-quoted reference to Ireton's paper,
the minutes cover several ways in which a general knowledge
disability in section 9-301(1)(a) would have interfered with le-
gitimate purposes in section 9-312. For instance, a purchase
money lender has a superpriority over after-acquired property
lenders who filed first. The New York committee thought that
a knowledge requirement on subsequent secured parties would
interfere with the after-acquired property rules,3 ' with the
purchase money superpriority,32 and with the rule that once A
files, A should be free to give future advances with permanent
priority over B, regardless of A's knowledge.33 It also ex-
pressed concern that the old version of section 9-301(1)(b)
might translate into a straight notice priority, rather than a
race-notice priority.3
When it came to an unambiguous race priority, however,
the New York committee drew the line and drew it clearly:
[I]n most cases, if not all, the time at which knowledge is relevant
30. See supra notes 17 & 23 and accompanying text.
31. "[A] rule depriving a secured party of his means of obtaining priority
by prompt filing would operate harshly in a case where he gave value without
knowledge of any earlier interest, but obtained that knowledge before the
debtor had rights in the collateral and thus before the security interest at-
tached." New York Minutes, supra note 17, at 63-64 (emphasis added).
32. Id at 62-63. The New York committee was wrong in this observation.
Section 9-301(1)(b) disabled knowledgeable subsequent secured parties. A
purchase money lender and an after-acquired property lender obtain their se-
curity interests at precisely the same time. See Carlson, Simultaneous Attach-
ment of Liens on After-Acquired Property, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 505, 516 (1985).
33. In a new § 9-312(5), the Article 9 subcommittee proposed that A be
given complete freedom to wipe out any B foolish enough to give advances af-
ter having seen (constructively or actually) A's financing statement on file.
The New York Committee supported revising § 9-301(1)(b) to make sure that
A's knowledge would never subordinate A's future advances, although it gave
a perfected A monopoly power over any customer bound on a future advance
clause. New York Minutes, supra note 17, at 64-65. For a discussion of this
technicality, see Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priori-
ties Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien, " 72 HARV. L. REV. 838,
857-61 (1959).
34. The Minutes also refer to a similar discussion:
It was also suggested that the language of Section 9-301(1)(b) is am-
biguous in referring to a subsequent party who "became such" with-
out knowledge of the security interest, in that it is not clear whether
the time of "becoming such" is the time when the security interest at-
taches, or the time when the security agreement was made, or when
the secured party gives value ....
New York Minutes, supra note 17, at 63.
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is the time when value is given, but quaere whether a person should
be allowed to obtain priority over an existing but unperfected security
interest by taking the same collateral as security for an unsecured
debt, or as additional security for a debt already secured, when he
knows of the unperfected security interest at the time of the security
agreement.3 5
With regard to the race priority, the New York Minutes reflect
the following resolutions:
(a) there is an inconsistencey between Section 9-301(1)(b) and
Section 9-312 which should be corrected;
(b) it is perhaps desirable, in order to avoid confusion, that all
rules of priority between security interests in the same collateral be
stated in Section 9-312, limiting Section 9-306 [3 6] to rules of subordina-
tion of an unperfected security interest to creditors and to transferees
who are not secured parties, and to a cross-reference to Section 9-312
in the case of other security interests.
(c) the principle embodied in Section 9-301(1)(b) under which
knowledge of an existing but unperfected security interest will pre-
vent an intervening secured party from obtaining priority should,
however, be preserved and stated in Section 9-312 as applicable to
some of the cases where Section 9-312 now provides for priority with-
out regard to it .... 37
We have here a clear denunciation of the race priority, with ap-
preciation for the fact that a broad knowledge requirement
could be used to interfere with purchase money superpriorities
and the like. The New York committee therefore wanted sec-
tion 9-312 to be the sole priority section between A and B (both
secured parties).
Given that the New York Law Revision Commission was
immensely influential in UCC drafting matters, why was not
this advice followed? Or, at least, why did not any of the active
participants in the drafting even respond to these concerns?
Reference to the eventual report of the New York Law Re-
vision Commission shows why. Recall that the Commission
had received unpublished markups of Article 9 that were not
generally available to the public. At the time of the New York
Law Revision Commission Report (February 29, 1956), only
Supplement No. 1 (containing a notice priority) had been offi-
cially promulgated by the Permanent Editorial Board. The Re-
port's passage on the race priority is as follows:
[A] The present text of Section 9-301(1)(b) [1952 draft] also declares
that an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of a
subsequent secured party who 'becomes such' without knowledge of
35. Id at 66-67.
36. This reference is incorrect. It should refer to § 9-301.
37. New York Minutes, supra note 17, at 65-66.
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the earlier security interest and who perfects his interest before the
earlier interest is perfected. [B] Section 9-312 and several supplemen-
tal sections state detailed rules as to priority between conflicting se-
curity interests. [C] Under these provisions, an unperfected security
interest may also be subordinate to the interest of a subsequent se-
cured party who had knowledge of the earlier interest. (Section 9-
301(1)(a) and Section 9-312 as revised in Supplement No. 1.) [D] The
Editorial Board's subcommittee on Article 9 has reconsidered the
question, how far knowledge of an earlier unperfected interest should
defeat a subsequent party's claim to priority if he perfects his interest
first. The subcommittee has proposed a substitute rule under which
knowledge would be immaterial except in particular cases where the
governing sections refer to it expressly. The problems are very com-
plex. [E] The Commission recognizes that some qualification may be
needed in the statement in Section 9-301(1)(b) indicating that the sub-
sequent party must be 'without knowledge,' but it questions the advis-
ability of a rule under which a subsequent party with knowledge of a
prior unperfected interest could acquire priority merely by prior
filing.3
8
That the Commission did in fact receive an advance copy of
the 1956 changes39 and noticed the introduction of a general
race priority between A and B is by no means apparent from
the quotation. As far as the public and even the Article 9
draftsmen were concerned, this comment could have been chal-
lenging the 1952 version of section 9-301(1)(a), which allowed
knowledgeable Bs to beat unperfected As when knowledgeable
Bs can also beat perfected As.40 The Report may be suggesting
that knowledgeable Bs should always lose, as they did when
section 9-301(1)(b) (1952) applied. Under this reading, the Law
Revision Commission does not even refer to the possible error
in the 1956 changes. Clause [D] refers only to Supplement No.
1 and its re-write of section 9-312, which does not mention
knowledge. Nevertheless, in Clause [E], the Commission disap-
proves of race priorities and favors general notice priorities.
Although the Law Revision Commission Report in general
generated numerous responses, the above criticism was never
discussed.41 The lack of reaction suggests that the Commission
38. NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 16, at 47.
39. Id. at 8 & n.4.
40. That knowledgeable Bs should win in this particular circumstance, by
the way, seems quite appropriate. Section 9-301(1)(a) provided that "[a]n un-
perfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of (a) persons as to
whom a perfected security interest is subordinate (subsection (2) of Section 9-
303) .... ." U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(a) (1952). Section 9-303(2) (1952) in turn listed
such persons as buyers in the ordinary course of business and materialmen
with a superpriority. If such Bs can win in spite of A's perfection, what such
Bs know should be totally irrelevant.
41. For instance, in a panel discussion on the New York Law Revision Re-
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Report was misunderstood as aimed at section 9-301(1)(a)
(knowledge did not matter when B could beat even perfected
As) and was dismissed as an uncogent criticism. Meanwhile, no
one else noticed that Article 9 had deleted the notice priority.
In -commercial law scholarship, the earliest references to
Article 9 as a "race" priority are surprisingly late. In 1959, Pe-
ter Coogan, a member of the Article 9 subcommittee, briefly
mentioned the race priority in an article defending against the
frequent criticism of the floating lien and its grant of monopoly
power to the first lender to file. The reference by no means
assumes that Article 9 is a race priority. Coogan stated that
"[u]nless the good faith requirements of section 1-203 change
the results, generally knowledge on the part of a holder of a
security interest otherwise entitled to priority does not
control ....
Soon thereafter, the first treatises on the UCC began to ap-
pear. Most of them do not really discuss the priority between A
and secured party Bs with knowledge. William Hawkland au-
thored the first treatise to say that B should winA3
In 1965, Gilmore commented extensively on the alleged
UCC race priority:
We are left with a puzzling situation. Until 1956, the Article fol-
lowed the approach which had been traditional under pre-Code law
by providing that an unperfected security interest was good against
subsequent claimants (including secured parties) with knowledge of
the unperfected interest. In the 1956 draft, it is clear that there was a
deliberate decision to deal separately with the case of the subsequent
secured party: he is deleted from § 9-301 (which otherwise maintains
the earlier position as to the effect of knowledge) and moved over to
§ 9-312. The general priority rule, which has become § 9-312(5), is
then rewritten without making any reference to knowledge.[44]
port, the criticism is never mentioned. See Panel Discussion, Report of the
New York Law Revision Commission, Areas of Agreement and Disagreement,
12 Bus. LAw. 49 (1956). In discussing the set of amendments in which the race
priority was introduced, William A. Schnader does not list the race priority as
one of the important substantive changes. Scnader, The New Movement To-
ward Uniformity in the Uniform Commercial Code Marches On, 13 Bus. LAW.
646, 664 (1958).
42. Coogan, supra note 33, at 859 n.80.
43. 2 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 656 (1964). Hawkland gives as a reason for the race priority the en-
couragement of filing and the elimination of circular priority problems (A fails
to file and is senior to B, a bad faith purchaser, who files and is senior to C, a
good faith purchaser who is therefore senior to A). Hawkland also refers to
the race priority as "despotic." Id.
44. In fact, § 9-312(5) had already been rewritten. See SUPPLEMENT No. 1,
supra note 8, at 74-76.
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Neither the text of subsection (5) nor the accompanying Comment is
conclusive on whether, with respect to the case of the earlier un-
perfected interest, the lack of reference to knowledge was by design
or inadvertence. If it is assumed that the draftsmen were deliberately
making a considerable change in prior law, this was an odd and unsat-
isfactory way to have done it-particularly in view of the fact that the
1956 version of § 9-301 maintains the earlier policy unchanged in com-
parable situations.
4 5
Unfortunately, Gilmore does not give us his personal recollec-
tion on the matter.
46
A year later, Carl Felsenfeld wrote an article that charac-
terized the history of the Article 9 race priority as follows:
[Article 9] effects a change in the basic pre-Code rule that failure to
45. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 26, § 34.2, at 901.
Gilmore made similar remarks about other drafting changes made in the
1956 Suggestions for Change. For instance, in writing about lapsed perfection
Gilmore noted that § 9-403(2) (lapse of five year limit on financing statements)
seemed to allow junior security interests to receive a promotion when the se-
nior security interest lapsed. Gilmore suggested that some words from the
statute that would have prevented such a promotion were inadvertently
dropped. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 6, § 21.6, at 589 n.4.
Robert Braucher specifically disputed this particular allegation of drafting
error.
As one who participated in the 1956 deliberations on the Code, I find
this treatment of the lapse question unsatisfying. My recollection is
that most of the members of the responsible subcommittee were far
less cheerful than Professor Gilmore now is about the prospect of cir-
cular priority, and that the revisions in question are two examples of
great pains taken to eliminate circular priorities.
Braucher, Book Review, 33 U. CH. L. REv. 890, 893 (1966). I cite Braucher's
comment for two reasons. First, it shows that Gilmore was not necessarily al-
ways right that apparent drafting accidents were indeed accidents. Second, a
race-notice priority itself produces circular prioritios. For instance, A fails to
file. B files and has knowledge of A. C files and has no knowledge of A. A is
therefore senior to B, who is senior to C, who is senior to A, and so forth. If
the Article 9 subcommittee really disliked circular priorities, doing away with
the race-notice priority altogether was a good way to do it. On the other hand,
§ 9-401(2) (if A tries to file but does so in the wrong place, B is junior if B has
knowledge of the contents of the statement) also creates a circular priority.
Yet the Article 9 subcommittee retained § 9-401(2). If hatred of circular priori-
ties explained the race priority, how did § 9-401(2) survive?
46. A word must be said about the semiotic assumptions of Gilmore and
others writing about commercial law in the 1960s. Even though Gilmore must
have been consulted on the 1956 deletions to § 9-301, and even though he had
just put forth the proposition that the race priority may have been the result
of accident, he still refers to the "meaning" of § 9-312(5) as being a race prior-
ity. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 26, at 901 ("The apparent meaning of § 9-312(5)
is that there is no good faith limitation and that knowledge at any time is ir-
relevant."). Thus, meaning is something different from the motives of those
who wrote the language in question and even different from what is perceived
by most readers of the language. Instead, statutes seem to have an essential
meaning that has been produced, perhaps, by consensus.
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perfect a lien will not destroy it as against one with knowledge of its
existence. While this change represents a conscious decision on the
part of the draftsmen,[4 7] there is reason to believe that it may not
have been fully deliberated. 4 8
Appended to this statement was a footnote, which, with Gil-
more's work, constitutes the only historical research published
on the race priority. Professor Felsenfeld noted that
"[k]nowledge appeared as a significant factor in the 1952 Offi-
cial Draft. . . . The recollections of the draftsmen with whom
the writer has talked are generally to the effect that they de-
sired to make Code perfection, as the factor presenting the few-
est evidentiary problems, the dominant test of lien priorities."49
In January 1986, Felsenfeld, now a professor at Fordham
Law School, was unable to reconstruct those conversations,
although he recalls that Homer Kripke and possibly Peter Coo-
gan held such a view.
After 1967 came a series of treatises on the UCC.50 The
treatises generally assume the existence of a race priority.51
They rarely discuss the history of the race statute, although
they occasionally refer to the linguistic ambiguity of section 9-
312(5). Only Steve Nickles has taken the position that the race
priority may not be the "meaning" of Article 9.52
4. EXTENSION OF THE RACE PRIORITY IN 1972
Concurrent with the above rationalization of Article 9's race
priority, Peter Coogan and Grant Gilmore engaged in a genteel
debate about the priority of lien creditor B against voluntary
future advances of secured party A, where A has perfected a se-
47. At this point, Felsenfeld notes the contrary view of Gilmore. See
supra note 45 and accompanying text.
48. Felsenfeld, Knowledge as a Factor in Determining Priorities Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 246 (1967) (footnote
omitted).
49. Id. at 247 n.11.
50. The history of UCC treatises is discussed in Winship, Contemporary
Commercial Law Literature in the United States, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 643, 653-55
(1982).
51. E.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-4, at 906 (1st ed. 1972). It is more than safe
to assume that the White and Summers treatise is the most read treatise on
the UCC.
52. Nickles, Rethinking Some Article 9 Problems-Subrogation, Equitable
Liens; Actual Knowledge; Waiver of Security Interests; Secured Party Liabil-
ity for Conversion Under Part 5, 34 ARK. L. REv. 1, 89 (1979). Gilmore also
comes close. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 26, § 34.2, at 898 ("The argument
can be made, with some degree of plausibility, that the apparent meaning of
the relevant provisions of the Article should be disregarded.").
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curity interest for an initial advance. Coogan thought that lien
creditor B would be senior to A's advances. 5 3 Gilmore thought
the opposite.-
The disagreement might have amounted to little enough.
After all, voluntary advances after B has obtained a judicial lien
on A's collateral seems a questionable lending strategy.55 At
about the same time, however, Congress undertook a reform of
the federal tax lien, giving the tax lien whatever priority it had
under state law.5 6 This reform suddenly made the Coogan-Gil-
more debate very important indeed. At stake was whether
lender advances could have priority over earlier tax liens. The
vulnerability of revolving credits to federal tax liens helped
lead to the decision to review Article 9. Thus, the Permanent
Editorial Board appointed a Review Committee to produce sug-
gested amendments in these areas.
The stated methodology of this committee limited amend-
ments to areas in which nonuniform enactments had occurred
or the practicing bar had complaints.5 7 The status of future ad-
vances against judicial liens was one such topic.5 8 The exist-
ence of a notice priority between A and lien creditor B was
another, owing to California's adoption of nonuniform legisla-
tion on the matter.5 9 The Review Committee's rationale for
53. Coogan, supra note 33, at 868.
54. 2 G. G=L.MORE, supra note 26, § 35.6, at 937-38.
55. "[W]ho cares?" White and Summers have written, commenting that
"[t]he cases in which a secured creditor will willingly make subsequent ad-
vances after another creditor has gone through the tedious process leading to a
lien on the collateral are likely to be as scarce as hen's teeth." J. WHITE AND
R. SUMM zERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 25.2, at 1033 (2d ed. 1980).
56. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, § 101, 80 Stat. 1125, 1128-29
(1966) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6323(d), (e) (1982)). For more de-
tailed coverage of the relationship between the Coogan-Gilmore debate and
the federal tax lien legislation, see Schroeder & Carlson, Future Nonadvance
Obligations Under Article 9 of the UCC" Legitimate Priority or Unwarranted
Squeezeout?, 102 BANKING L.J. 412, 418-21 (1985).
57. "[T]he Committee has eschewed amendment merely for the sake of
theoretical improvement where there was no pressing problem illustrated by
nonuniform amendment or by substantial demand for change." 1972 Official
Text Showing Changes Made in Former Text of Article 9, Secured Transac-
tions, and of Related Sections and Reasons for Changes-General Comment on
the Approach of the Review Committee for Article 9 (October, 1970) in UNI-
FORM COMMRCIAL CODE 1978 OFFICALL TEXT app. II, at 870 (West 1978) [here-
inafter Review Committee Comment].
58. Section 9-301(4) was drafted to protect future advances from judicial
liens and hence from the federal tax lien. Id E-44, at 898.
59. California made knowledge irrelevant to B's priority unless A tried to
file and gave A a ten-day grace period. Act of June 8, 1963, ch. 819, 1963 Cal.
1986]
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choosing the race priority was that the former section "was
completely inconsistent in spirit with the rules of priority be-
tween security interests, where knowledge plays a very minor
role. °6 0 Such reasoning constitutes a metonymic error-mistak-
ing a part for the whole. The "spirit" of Article 9 priorities
was, more accurately, a notice priority in five of six categories
plus a potential drafting error in the sixth category. The 1972
Review Committee seemed to rely upon a consensus of mean-
ing among law professors, as opposed to the meaning set in
place by the authors of the words.
Stat. 1849, 1977-78 (codified as amended at CAL. COM. CODE § 9301 (West
1986)). The Review Committee also created a race priority between A and lien
creditor B but did not grant a grace period. Review Committee Comment,
supra note 57, E-47, at 899.
60. Review Committee Comment, supra note 57, § 9-301, at 942.
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